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ABSTRACT 
 
There are good reasons to expect that the process of European integra-
tion might bring about a renaissance of both comparative and private inter-
national law—the two disciplines in which Herbert Bernstein had excelled 
in both New and Old World alike.  To be sure, Europe’s legal systems must 
respond to processes of economic and political integration.  Nevertheless, it 
seems quite unrealistic to expect from the European Union any comprehen-
sive harmonization of private law, as Europe’s systems of private law are 
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Isabel Jaramillo in Cambridge, Massachusetts and Luca Di Preso in Florence.  And I owe many thanks 
to Robert Gallagher, editor of the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law for the work he 
has invested on this manuscript. 
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invisible pour les yeux,” explains le petit prince in Antoine de Saint Exupéry’s famous novel—and 
hosts at Duke could not possibly know all of the reasons which made their invitation so precious to me.  
My doctoral dissertation dealt with the conflict of laws methodology of one of Duke Law’s famous 
scholars, the late Brainerd Currie.  See CHRISTIAN JOERGES, ZUM FUNKTIONSWANDEL DES 
KOLLISIONSRECHTS: DIE “GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST ANALYSIS” UND DIE “KRISE DES 
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obtained an optimal assessment in Frankfurt but the quest for publication in the prestigious series of 
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frowning in the Institute’s directorate.  Konrad Zweigert, however, was fair enough to ask for a review 
by a young professor whose authority in the field was undisputable.  It was none other than Herbert 
Bernstein, who defended my work—and my chances for an academic career.  Decades later, at a con-
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to be grateful for the invitation to Duke, but I would like to mention another—the wonderful hospitality 
I experienced during my visit to Durham, North Carolina. 
FINAL JOERGES.DOC 3/8/2005  9:42 AM 
150 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:149 
deeply entwined in the economic and political histories of the polities 
which they order and to which they owe their legitimacy.  Europe’s identity 
is defined by the diversity of its legal heritage.  Should not deepened com-
parative studies prepare and accompany the search for a Europeanized pri-
vate law system?  Further, is it not the very vocation of private interna-
tional law to organize constructive responses to legal diversity? 
Pertinent efforts have been undertaken and are under way.  And yet, 
this essay argues that the Europeanization process follows a logic of its 
own, with which none of our inherited legal disciplines currently seem able 
to cope.  Three difficulties will be discussed.  One is inherent in the very 
general developments of “post-classical” private law, in particular its link-
ages with regulatory and distributive policies and its opening to social val-
ues and human rights.  Comparative law has often furthered and private in-
ternational law has adapted to this (in Germany) so-called materialization 
process.  Europeanization, however, adds challenging new dimensions.  
These dimensions are inherent in the multilevel structures of the European 
polity and hence inevitable.  The interventions of European law into gen-
eral private law (the codified systems of continental Europe and the com-
mon law of the United Kingdom) have so far been quite marginal.  Yet 
Europe has very intensively and quite comprehensively reorganized the 
regulatory framework of private transactions, whereas the distributive wel-
fare state institutions in which private relations are embedded have re-
mained the domain of national legal systems.  The Europeanization of pri-
vate law is therefore to a large degree about the restructuring of the 
linkages of private law with its (Europeanized) regulatory environment and 
the manner in which it is embedded in welfare state institutions.  Europe-
anization affects this dimension through the freedoms it grants to European 
citizens. 
European law is a transformative discipline.  It requires respect for its 
principles and the regulatory prescription it imposes in the realms of the 
enumerated competencies of the European legislature.  It cannot, however, 
provide comprehensive responses to its quests for change.  Europeanization 
affects national systems of private law only selectively. The process of 
change is incremental and this essay, therefore, does not try to present the 
Europeanization of private law as the building of a new system of rules and 
principles.  Rather, it presents and explores patterns of legal change in three 
cases of exemplary importance. 
As will become apparent, neither comparative law, nor private interna-
tional law, nor European law, can lay claim to exclusive leadership in the 
Europeanization process.  Europeanization is generating a new legal disci-
pline.  The challenging task of this discipline is to provide normative guid-
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ance for the operation of private law within the multilevel system of gov-
ernance that Europe has become. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In what way can one expose an American readership to the particular 
challenges of the Europeanization of private law?  Comprehensive reports 
on the state of legal developments and academic debates are currently not 
conceivable.  The study of the Europeanization of private law is an expand-
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ing discipline, and is growing at exponential rates.  Germany is certainly 
the most prolific of all European legal communities, boasting a production 
of not less than eleven habilitations theses defended over the last few years, 
many more than several hundred pages each.1  The Netherlands is hardly 
less active, and is arguably more effective because it tends to give up the 
use of its own language in its habilitations.2  Ever more jurisdictions make 
their views known and the epistemic community is Europeanizing.  Indeed, 
conferences on European private law have long been multinational, trans-
national working groups and academic societies have been established,3 
and the annual meetings of the Common Core project in Trento attract ever 
more attention—even overseas.4  Meanwhile, in the background, the Euro-
pean Commission and other institutional actors tirelessly promote (their 
view of) the cause of Europe’s private law. 
Instructive reports addressing an American readership are of course 
nevertheless possible—and available.5  This provides me with a unique op-
portunity to try a different approach.  My objective in this essay will be to 
explore and explain why Europe has become such a fascinating legal labo-
ratory.  Messages from a laboratory should not be expected to transmit 
fully elaborated, complete conceptualizations.  The specific risk of such 
messages is their tendency to seem both cryptic and eclectic simply be-
cause they presuppose too much background information.  Their possible 
benefit, however, is that they may create and enhance interest in proceed-
ings in the laboratory, and in fact may excite study on this side of the At-
lantic. 
 
 1. Since JOSEF DREXL, DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE SELBSTBESTIMMUNG DES VERBRAUCHERS 
(1998), the most recent habilitation I am aware of was submitted by Christoph Schmid to the law fac-
ulty in Munich.  CHRISTOPH SCHMID, DIE INSTRUMENTALISIERUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS DURCH DIE 
EUROPÄISCHE UNION: PRIVATRECHT UND PRIVATRECHTSKOZEPTIONEN IN DER ENTWICKLUNG DER 
EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATIONSVERFASSUNG (2004) (thesis on file with author).  It is outstanding in the 
depth of its analyses which reflect developments of postclassical private law on the one hand and the 
various stages of the European integration project on the other. 
 2. ARTHUR S. HARTKAMP, ET AL., TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (2nd ed. 1998); MARTIJN 
W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE LAW IN 
EUROPE (2002).  English is the lingua franca of the Maastricht Journal of Comparative Law, the Euro-
pean Review of Private Law, The Ius Commune Lectures, and The Electronic Journal of Comparative 
Law,  at http://www.ejcl.org (last visited May 28, 2004). 
 3. See Kristina Riedl, Europäisierung des Privatrechts: Die “Recht-Fertigung”  
wissenschaftlicher Vereinheitlichungsprojekte (2003) (Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute 
Florence 2003) (on file with author). 
 4. See The Common Core of European Private Law, University of Trento, 
http://www.jus.unitn.it/dsg/common-core/home.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2005). 
 5. See Christoph Schmid, Patterns of Legislative and Adjudicative Integration of Private Law in 
Europe, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 415, 415–86 (2002). 
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This article will proceed in two steps.  Section I will first sketch out 
how the three disciplines of European law, comparative law and private in-
ternational law approach the Europeanization process.  It is submitted that 
none of these disciplines can effectively address the unique intricacies of 
the Europeanization process by themselves.  A two-step argument is pre-
sented to support this thesis.  First, I will resort to an analysis of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) as a “multi-level system of governance” and the critique 
of “methodological nationalism” in political science.  Second, I will pro-
vide a preliminary reconstruction of these theorems into a more legal, albeit 
transdisciplinary, language.   
Section II will substantiate my skepticism as to the potential of the 
three established legal disciplines to effectively orient the process of Euro-
peanization through an analysis of three case studies.  The first example is 
from the field of product liability law, where the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) seems to suggest that European legislation should govern Europeani-
zation.  The second example addresses the privatization of public ser-
vices—specifically the legal battle between European state aid law, a sec-
tion of the European Community Treaty chapter on competition policy, and 
regulatory arrangements at the national level.  In characterizing this ten-
sion, I will use the term “diagonal conflict” and praise the ECJ for its sensi-
tivity to the non-unitary character of the European polity and its “proce-
duralizing” approach to the resolution of tensions.  The third example is 
drawn from company law.  Whereas the jurisprudence of the ECJ since its 
famous Centros6 judgment is widely interpreted as a move towards regula-
tory competition, I will defend a different interpretation, arguing that the 
ECJ is transforming the economic freedoms as enshrined in the European 
Community Treaty7 into political rights held by European citizens.  The 
case studies do not reveal a new “system” of principles and rules.  Rather, 
they illuminate patterns of change which are at work—and in conflict—in 
the Europeanization Process.  Section III will take up the analytical frame-
work introduced in the second part of Section I.  It will substantiate the re-
construction of Europe’s multilevel system of governance into a framework 
of legal categories.  The concluding message will be that the Europeaniza-
tion of private law should be conceived as a process which must find its le-
gitimacy in the normative quality of the Europeanization process. 
 
 6. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459. 
 7. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) 
[hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
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I.  EUROPEANIZATION AS A CONTEST OF LEGAL DISCIPLINES 
Three legal disciplines seem particularly close to the Europeanization 
process in the realm of private law—European law, comparative law and 
private international law.  “Close” is a metaphor for the validity criteria and 
normative perspectives of these disciplines, however they are not identical.  
For that reason, the claims of these disciplines to govern and orient the Eu-
ropeanization process represent a contest, akin to the “contest of faculties” 
Immanuel Kant analyzed in his famous 1789 essay.8  Kant’s master disci-
pline is not among the three candidates engaged in the contest—Kant’s 
master discipline is philosophy.  It is this discipline which he sought to 
promote because in it reason (Vernunft) is the highest—and in fact the 
only—authority.  Philosophy is not among the three legal disciplines en-
gaged in our contest.  Should that imply that no discipline deserves the 
championship in our contest?  Not exactly.  Although the allusion to Kant 
is intended to signal a conceptual and normative lacunae in our discourse, I 
do not wish to insinuate that we could derive from practical philosophy sat-
isfactory answers to our queries.  My contention is more modest, but still 
ambitious enough.  It has both an analytical and a prescriptive dimension.  
My argument rests on the premise that all three disciplines are not yet con-
ceptually in tune with the postnational constellation the Europeanization 
process has generated.9 
These legal disciplines are still ruled by their inherited methodological 
nationalism.10  This is why they are engaging in a contest which none of 
them can effectively win.  In essence, they need to transform their contest 
into a search for a new paradigm, and it goes without saying that the gener-
alizing qualifications which I will employ are inadequate in that they do not 
 
 8. Immanuel Kant, The Contest of Faculties, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS (Hans Reiss, ed., 
2nd ed. 1991). 
 9. Two concepts seem particularly helpful in this respect.  One is Jürgen Habermas’s “post-
national constellation,” introduced in an essay on the contemporary problems of democratic govern-
ance. Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy, in  JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 58–112 (Max Pensky ed., 
2001).  That term and Habermas’s normative concerns are of general importance. Constitutional democ-
racies were institutionalized in nation states and federations. Post-national constellations are therefore 
highly ambivalent—as the debates on the European Union’s democracy deficit document.  In the “Edi-
tor’s Introduction” to Habermas’ essays, Max Pensky explains the term constellation as correcting the 
understanding of “globalization as the end of democratization—not as its culmination but as the defin-
ing feature of the historical epoch marking the end of the national-state model for the institution of de-
mocracy”. The erosion of that model is accompanied by conflicting fears and hopes: “Finding a way to 
sort them out, to confront their ambiguity squarely, and to shed some explanatory light on them—to 
analyze them as challenges, rather than as overwhelming fate—is not so easy.  But this is the task that 
Jürgen Habermas sets for himself in The Postnational Constellation.” Id. at viii. 
 10. On these terms see I.D infra. 
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exhaust the specter of tendencies and views in any of the fields under con-
sideration.  Comprehensive accounts are not possible, but they might also 
be unnecessary.  My claim, however, is that the term “methodological na-
tionalism” is effective in that it captures and conveys the unique national 
characteristics from the formative phases which have remained decidedly 
influential.  The validity of the argument does not depend on the current 
strength of these inherited orientations.  Quite to the contrary, it claims that 
these traditions are eroding and is a plea for their conscious abolition. 
A. European Law 
My argument may sound particularly irritating in relation to the first-
named discipline, European law.  Isn’t the European project exactly about 
the abolition of the nation-state as a sovereign entity?  Yes and no.  The an-
swer is yes insofar as the European Community was designed as primarily 
an economic project, not designed to establish a federation or an entity sub-
stituting the nation-state but rather crafted to exert a disciplining control 
over the nation-state.  The answer is no, however, insofar as conceptualiza-
tions of European law in general—and of European private law in particu-
lar—copy nation-state models.  Both dimensions can be observed in the 
legendary Van Gend en Loos11 judgment, which marks the birth of the In-
tegration-Through-Law project: 
[The EEC Treaty] is more than an agreement which merely creates mu-
tual obligations between the contracting states. . . . [T]he Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which 
the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, 
and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Commu-
nity law, therefore, not only imposes obligations on individuals, but is 
also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal 
heritage. . . .12 
This message has evolved into the supremacy doctrine,13 in which Com-
munity law—even secondary law—trumps national law, even constitu-
tional law.  It is, paradoxically enough, the steady deepening of European 
integration which renders the orthodox understanding of legal supranation-
alism factually implausible and normatively unattractive. 
 
 11. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nether-
lands Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 E.C.R. 1 [hereinafter Van Gend en Loos]. 
 12. Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 24. 
 13. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW 275–315 (3rd ed. 2003). 
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The debate on the constitutionalization of Europe and the so-called 
convention process14 mirrors these tensions.  They are also visible in the 
Europeanization of private law for compelling, although not necessarily 
sound, reasons, as the Community effectively entered the private law arena 
through a somewhat disdained backdoor—consumer protection.  Consumer 
protection has been both a functional need and a normative achievement 
since the 1970s.  Initially, the European Commission supported pertinent 
research activities and the formation of a European community of con-
sumer law advocates.15  The private law community, however, generally 
responded with benign neglect for as long as practically possible.  When 
the growing weight of European law grew irresistibly, however, attitudes 
changed profoundly.  The lamenting over the patchwork character of Euro-
pean legislative acts characterized by early initiatives in the realm of con-
sumer protection16 was followed by the plea for nothing less than a Euro-
pean codification of private law.  The alliance defending this idea, 
however, has been decidedly heterogeneous.17  The European Parliament is 
often cited as the most committed institutional advocate of a European 
code, primarily due to its resolutions of 198918 and 1994,19 which did not 
have an immediate impact, but did help to keep the idea of a European code 
alive.20  By now, the European Parliament has become more cautious, or at 
least more patient.21   
 
 14. Which lead to the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of July 18, 2003, Euro-
pean Convention, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf (last 
visited May 28, 2004). 
 15. On the history, achievements and ambitions of European consumer law see generally 
NORBERT REICH & HANS W. MICKLITZ, EUROPÄISCHES VERBRAUCHERRECHT (4th ed. 2003).  This 
book is the latest in a long and ongoing cooperative project which started out with NORBERT REICH & 
HANS W. MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
(1980).  Consumer law is thoroughly “Europeanized.”  Its proponents not only know and cite each 
other, they strive for a common cause.  See e.g., STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EC CONSUMER LAW AND 
POLICY (1997). 
 16. See among many Hein Kötz, Gemeineuropäisches Zivilrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KONRAD 
ZWEIGERT 481, 483 (1981); Peter Hommelhoff, Zivilrecht unter dem Einfluß europäischer 
Rechtsangleichung, 192 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS, 71, 71–107 (1992). 
 17. See generally Schmid, supra note 5. 
 18. 1989 O.J. (C 158) 400. 
 19. 1994 O.J. (C 205) 518. 
 20. See Christian von Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European Private Law, 
8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 379 (2002).  Christoph Schmid, Legitimacy Conditions of a European Civil Code, 
8 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 277, 277–98 (2001). 
 21. In Resolution A5-0384/2001, Resolution on the Approximation of Civil and Commercial Law, 
dated Nov. 15, 2001, which responded to the European Commission’s Communication on European 
Contract Law, COM (01) 398, the Parliament advocated the creation of a European Law Institute for 
the preparation of a European Restatement. 
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The agenda of the European Commission is more difficult to decipher.  
The Commission’s most important and widely discussed recent initiative, 
the Communication on the future of European Contract Law, published in 
July 2001,22 continues to appeal, as the consumer protection directives did, 
to the functional necessities of market building and the need to prevent dis-
tortions of competition caused by legal differences among Member States.  
Yet the implications of this appeal are not spelled out unambiguously.  On 
the one hand, the Commission left the narrow confines of consumer protec-
tion and announced that it may have to look at unjust enrichment and “as-
pects of tort law.”23  On the other hand, it has restricted itself to four rela-
tively limited inquiries, without explicitly revealing its own preferences.  
Should Europeanization be left to market mechanisms?24  Should Europe 
follow the American Restatement technique?25  Alternatively, should 
Europe “consolidate” what has been accomplished so far?26 Or should 
Europe embark upon wide-ranging legislative activities?  The 181 re-
sponses from European institutions, governments, the business world, con-
sumer organizations, legal practitioners and academics have been summa-
rized by the Commission in a recent “Action Plan.”27 
While the Commission prefers not to reveal its own preferences, many 
of its close academic supporters—especially those in Germany and the 
Netherlands—do make their desire for a European civil code project 
known.28  The most prominent advocate of this idea is Christian von Bar.29  
Is this a state-building project?  The SGECC, the Study Group on a Euro-
pean Civil Code,30 emphasizes that its contribution should be neutral and 
non-political—essentially an academic research project.31  German observ-
ers will recognize the continuities and hardly be surprised by the protests 
against this project in France.32  Unlike the creator of the French Code 
 
 22. COM(01)398 final. 
 23. Communication from the Commission on European Contract Law, COM(01) 398 final, at 
para. 13. 
 24. Id. at paras. 49–51. 
 25. Id. at paras. 52–56. 
 26. Id. at paras. 57–60. 
 27. A More Coherent European Contract Law—An Action Plan, COM(03)68 final. 
 28. ARTHUR S. HARTKAMP ET AL., supra note 2. 
 29. See supra note 20, at 385.  For a detailed reconstruction of the origins of these ideas in the 
Netherlands and Northern Germany, see Riedl, supra note 3, at 297. 
 30. For more information, please visit the Study Group’s website at www.sgecc.net (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2004). 
 31. Riedl, supra note 3, at 300 and accompanying references. 
 32. Yves Lequette, Quelques remarques à propos du projet de code civil européen de Monsieur 
von Bar, RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, No. 28, Jul. 25, 2002, at 2202–14; but see Bénédicte Fauvarque-
Cosson, Faut-il un Code civil européen, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL, No. 3, at 463–80 
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civil—and unlike Heidelberg’s famous Anton Justus Friedrich Thibaut 
(1772–1840)—the von Bar Group33 defines codification not as a political 
act, but rather places itself in the tradition of Friedrich Carl von Savigny 
(1779–1861) and Bernhard Windscheid (1871–92), the mastermind in the 
construction of Germany’s Burgerlichem Gesetzbuch—that “cathedral of 
national glory.”34  In that tradition the codification of private law does not 
require a specifically political mandate.  Rather, its legitimacy stems from 
scholarly deliberation which guides the process of codification.  Already in 
their “Joint Response” to the Commission Communication of 2001, Ole 
Lando’s Contract Law Group and Christian von Bar’s Code Group have 
spelled out how this vision should be implemented, namely, in four—or 
five—steps.35  First, the Joint Response advocates a Restatement based 
upon “an impartial formulation of principles in the light of detailed com-
parative research.”  Second, the Joint Response suggests this Restatement 
should then become “the binding foundation of all private law questions 
raised by the award of contracts by public bodies.”  The joint response pro-
vides three additional recommendations to arrive at what is essentially a 
mandatory European Law.36  Sweet melodies?37—Familiar old melodies, at 
any rate.  The input and output of this process could be characterized in the 
words of Horst Heinrich Jakobs in his praise of the German example, rep-
resenting a code created by scholarship, a code not dominating scholarship 
 
(2002); B. Fauvarque-Cosson, Droit européen des contrats: première réaction au plan d’action de la 
Commission,  RECUEIL LE DALLOZ, No. 18, at 1171–73 (2003); Ph. Malinvaud, Réponse - hors délai - à 
la Commission européenne: à propos d’un code européen des contrats, RECUEIL LE DALLOZ, No. 33, at 
2542–51 (2002); Jean Huet, Nous faut-il un “euro” droit civil?, RECUEIL LE DALLOZ, No. 34, at 2611–
14 (2002). 
 33. See Reidl, supra note 3; Von Bar, supra note 20. 
 34. “Dom nationaler Herrlichkeit,” cited by Reinhard Zimmermann, in HISTORISCH-KRITISCHER 
KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB: BAND I: ALLGEMEINER TEIL (Matthias Schmoeckel, Joachim Rückert & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2003). 
 35. Commission on European Contract Law & Study Group on a Civil Code, Communication on 
European Contract Law: Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code of October 25, 2001, at 
http://www.sgecc.net/index.php?subsite=subsite_4&id=27 (last visited May 28, 2004) [hereinafter Joint 
Response]. 
 36. Joint Response, supra note 35, at paras. 62 and 69.  The five steps are summarized on pages 
49–50 of the Joint Response.  Step 4 is optional and might seem a bit odd at first blush.  It maintains 
European law should be mandatory for cross border transactions.  That restraint is apparently meant as a 
precautionary measure against anxieties in national legal systems.  A sophisticated version of this idea 
was developed by Stefan Grundmann & W. Kerber, European System of Contract Laws: A Map for 
Combining the Advantatges of Centralised and Decentralised Rule-making, in AN ACADEMIC GREEN 
PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 295 (Stefan Grundmann & Jules Stuyck eds., 2002). 
 37. Reinhard Zimmermann, Heard melodies are sweet, those unheard are sweeter. . ., 193 
ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 122–69 (1993). 
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but dominated by it.38  In plain English: It is the learned jurist who is best 
qualified to produce the law, not the legislature and not the judge. 
Neither Savigny nor Windscheid represent the full range of the Ger-
man codification tradition, nor are their heirs monopolists in the debates on 
the significance of codification.  Among their most outspoken adversaries 
is Ugo Mattei, one of the leading figures of the Trento Common Core Pro-
ject.39  In his philippic Hard Code Now!,40 Mattei pleads for a code of a dif-
ferent quality.  Mattei argues that only a civil code that fits the specific so-
cial fabric of European capitalism could counter the erosion of the social 
state content of private law.  A code “with deep enough foundations and 
high enough vaulting,” designed to include these social values “in its con-
ceptual edifice” is what Otto von Gierke (1841–1921), one of Bernhard 
Windscheid’s most famous adversaries, had postulated.41 
But do such references to old German professors make any sense?  Is 
the choice between the heritage of Windscheid and that of von Gierke 
really on the European agenda?  The call for these civil codes is not in 
touch with the present state of the European Union and neither of these per-
spectives seem normatively attractive.  These reservations will be substan-
tiated below42 after a discussion of the two other competing disciplines: 
comparative law and private international law. 
B. Comparative Law 
European law is often perceived as an autonomous body of law, striv-
ing for the harmonization, and often even the uniformity, of rules.  Such a 
perception, however, is overly simplistic and incomplete.  Even European 
law as enshrined in the original 1958 Treaty and the many later amend-
ments is not uniform throughout the Union.  Since the uniformity of its 
meaning cannot be ensured through the adoption of a common text (as 
translated in so many languages), one could argue there is no such thing as 
a common European law.  Summarizing some two decades of coteaching 
European law with many colleagues from many European countries: What 
 
 38. “. . .[e]in Gesetzbuch, das die Quelle des Rechts nicht in sich trägt, sondern in der 
Wissenschaft hat, von der es geschaffen worden ist, ein Gesetzbuch, das nicht die Wissenschaft 
beherrschen will, sondern das von dieser beherrscht sein soll. . .”  HORST HEINRICH JAKOBS, 
WISSENSCHAFT UND GESETZGEBUNG IM BÜRGERLICHEN RECHT NACH DER RECHTSQUELLENLEHRE DES 
19. JAHRHUNDERTS 160 (1983). 
 39. See supra note 4. 
 40. Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS, Vol. 2, No. 1, Art. 1 (2002), 
available at www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss1/art1. 
 41. OTTO VON GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS 17 (1889). 
 42. See discussion in infra Section I.D and III.C. 
FINAL JOERGES.DOC 3/8/2005  9:42 AM 
160 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:149 
we have instead (and have learned to live with) are Belgium, Dutch, Eng-
lish, French, German, Italian, and many more versions of European law.  In 
essence, there are as many European laws as there are relatively autono-
mous legal discourses, organized mainly along national, linguistic and cul-
tural lines.  How could it be otherwise?  In the core areas of private law, the 
European Union has to this point affected only marginal change.  Indeed, 
Europe’s systems of private law are deeply entwined in the economic and 
political circumstances of the polities which they order and to which they 
owe their legitimacy.  Comparative law is the discipline which seems best 
equipped to explore and articulate these insights.43  Comparative research is 
generally a cumbersome exercise and intra-European comparisons have 
long been neglected because of the common interest of all Europeans to 
learn about the most dynamic of all legal cultures, the United States.  This 
is now changing rapidly.  Intra-European comparative studies are well un-
der way.44  These activities are accompanied by rich theoretical debates.  It 
is not my ambition here to review, let alone evaluate, these myriad debates 
and studies.  I will instead point to the often quite paradoxical dimensions 
of the present state of the comparative art—comparative law owes its exis-
tence to the discovery of legal diversity as established by the Westphalian 
state system.  Comparativists have always done both: they have underlined 
the autonomy of legal systems and sought for substantive similarities and 
functional equivalents.45  In both orientations they have cultivated tradi-
tions of “methodological nationalism” which are not well prepared to un-
derstand denationalization processes, the interactions between formerly 
more autonomous legal systems and their links to transnational levels of 
governance.  “Methodological nationalism” is of surprising vitality. 
An example is Pierre Legrand’s provocative and thought provoking 
nonconvergence thesis.46  This thesis is directed against functionalism in 
comparative law and equally against any codification initiative.  Its basis is 
 
 43. Cf. Konrad Zweigert, Die Rechtsvergleichung im Dienste der europäischen 
Rechtsvereinheitlichung, 16 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT 387 (1951). 
 44. Suffice it here to point again to the Common Core project, supra note 4, the ius commune lec-
tures and casebook series; Ole Lando’s Lando group; and the new attention for integration perspectives.  
Cf. Ralf Michaels, Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law in the Light of European Inte-
gration, Brüssel 26–28. Oktober2002, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT (1993). 
 45. See David Kennedy, The Politics and Methods of Comparative Law, in THE COMMON CORE 
OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE PROJECT 131–208 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei  eds., 
2002). 
 46. Cf. Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52 
(1996); Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 
111 (1997); Pierre Legrand, Are Civilians Educable? 18 LEGAL STUD. 216 (1998); PIERRE LEGRAND, 
FRAGMENTS ON LAW-AS-CULTURE (1999). 
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the epistemological assertion that common law and civil law cannot com-
municate.  Legrand’s powerful critique of rule-oriented, rule-restricted 
ideas about law and comparative research, his emphasis on the cultural 
specificity of laws and his respect for the “deep structures of legal rational-
ity”47 all seem to presuppose an autonomy which none of the individual le-
gal systems in the EU can claim.48 
Reinhard Zimmermann posits opposing views.  He believes in the ex-
istence and survival of a common European legal heritage, which com-
prises the (non-American) common law.49  This common heritage has in his 
view survived the formation of the European nation states, and thus it is by 
definition transnational.  Can we, and does Zimmermann himself, trust in 
the vitality of this heritage?  The nation-state has during its welfarist era 
transformed the systems of private law thoroughly.  Europeanization has 
not turned the wheel of history around.  It has instead reformed and mod-
ernized the regulatory frameworks of the European economy.  The ius 
commune had little to contribute to that transformation.  Zimmermann has 
joined  the codification movement.50  Does this indicate that he would not 
really believe in his own theses about the common legal heritage on which 
the Europeanization process should build?  This is not his message. What 
may look like inconsistency at first glance has logic.  In order to survive 
and gain acceptance, Europe’s common legal heritage seems to depend 
upon a helping legislative hand.51 
 
 47. Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 60–
61 (1996). 
 48. Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and 
Social Sciences, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE LAW (Mark van Hoecke ed. forthcoming 2004). 
 49. Reinhard Zimmermann, Das Römisch-Kanonische ius commune als Grundlage europäischer 
Rechtseinheit 47 JURISTENZEITUNG 8 (1992); Reinhard Zimmerman, Der europäische Charakter des 
englischen Rechts—Historische Verbindungen zwischen civil law und common law, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 4 (1993); Reinhard Zimmerman, Civil Code and Civil Law: The 
“Europeanization” of Private Law Within the European Community and the Re-emergence of a 
European Legal Science, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 63–105 (1994/95); cf., Reiner Schulze, European 
Legal History—A New Field of Research in Germany, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 270, 270–95 (1992). 
 50. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law and European Legal Unity, in ARTHUR S. 
HARTKAMP ET AL., supra note 2, at 21. 
 51. Functionalism, as represented famously in the Kötz/Zweigert standard oeuvre continues to 
dominate comparative research.  KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., Oxford, 3d ed., 1998); see also AXEL FLESSNER & HEIN KÖTZ , 
EUROPÄISCHES VERTRAGSRECHT (1996).  Hein Kötz has always differentiated between the comparative 
law perceptions of the international system and that of other disciplines.  The term “multi-level govern-
ance” designates a post-national constellation which functionalism has not been prepared to address.  At 
the same time, Kötz was ever an outspoken skeptical critic of harmonization projects.  Compare Hein 
Kötz, The Trento Project and its Contribution to the Europeanization of Private Law, in THE COMMON 
CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE PROJECT 209–19 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei 
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C. Private International Law 
The tensions between private international law and European law are 
fascinating and they have a history of their own.52  Since European law es-
tablished itself as a sui generis discipline between national public law and 
international law, and the integration process did not address it for such a 
long time, the masters of the new discipline did not pay it a great deal of 
attention.53 The decisions in which the ECJ adjudicated private interna-
tional law constellations and set aside its rules and principles without men-
tioning this discipline are indeed legion.  Academic discoveries and en-
counters were bound to follow.  Private international law scholars started to 
recommend their discipline as the softer alternative to a harmonization of 
substantive law.54  Some of them began to realize that the principle of mu-
tual recognition adopted by the ECJ in its celebrated Cassis de Dijon deci-
sion amounted to a duty to apply foreign mandatory (public) law.55  The 
Community legislators resorted to choice-of-law rules in its secondary leg-
islation.56  Consumer lawyers saw a chance to overcome the social poverty 
of private international law.57  Intensive research has been undertaken to 
determine to what degree European law, especially the fundamental free-
 
eds., 2002).  Functionalism can see equivalencies in the responses of legal systems to the problems they 
have to address.  It has no conceptual language for the integration process. 
 52. The legendary Integration-Through-Law Project initiated in the 1980s by Mauro Cappelletti, 
Maria Seccombe and J.H.H. Weiler had included comparative analyses of the choice-of-law problems 
in Europe’s internal market and the American federation.  INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND 
THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (Cappelletti, Soccombe & Weiler eds. 1986).  For a particularly 
nuanced later survey compare Holger Spamann, Choice of Law in a Federal System and an Internal 
Market (Jean Monnet Program Working Paper No. 8/01, 2001), available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/012601.html (last visited May 28, 2004). 
 53. Among the often cited exceptions is Walter Hallstein, Angleichung des Privat und 
Prozeßrechts in der europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 28 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 211 (1964). 
 54. Karl F. Kreuzer, Die Europäisierung des internationalen Privatrechts - Vorgaben des Ge-
meinschaftsrechts, in PETER-CHRISTIAN MÜLLER-GRAFF, GEMEINSAMES PRIVATRECHT IN DER 
EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 273 (1993).  Wolfgang Fikentscher, Harmonizing National and Fed-
eral European Private Laws, and a Plea for a Conflicts-of-law Approach, in THE COMMON CORE OF 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE PROJECT 43–48 (Mauro Bussani & U. Mattei eds.,  2002) 
comes close to the positions defended in the text, especially when considering the selective scope of 
European law.  See discussion infra II.C on “diagonal conflicts.” 
 55. Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649; Cf. JOHANNES FETSCH, EINGRIFFSNORMEN 
UND EG-VERTRAG 5, 21, 71, 126, 319 (2002). 
 56. For a very comprehensive survey see Fréderic Fourtoy, L’impact du droit communautaire 
secondaire sur le droit international privé français (2003) (Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute 
Florence 2003) (on file with author). 
 57. Konrad Zweigert, Zur Armut des internationalen Privatrechts an sozialen Werten, 37 RABELS 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 435 (1973). 
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doms and the principle of mutual recognition, trump private international 
law.58 
By now, we are witnessing, particularly in Germany,59 the steady 
growth of this sophisticated debate—a debate which will likely go on for 
some time to come.  These developments are all the more interesting since 
the awareness that European law can be constructively interpreted as a con-
flict-of-laws discipline is gaining some ground.60  What remains apparently 
difficult to accept is the message that choice-of-law methodologies can be 
used in postnational constellations where they no longer refer to a compre-
hensive legal system, but rather organize the cooperation between different 
levels of governance and resolve the tensions which result within national 
systems from the selective interventions of European law.61  The message 
of such analyses is no longer to recommend private international law as a 
 
 58. Wulf-Henning Roth, Der Einfluss des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf das 
Internationale Privatrecht, 1991 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT  623, 623–73; Jürgen Basedow, The Communitarization of the Conflict of Law Rules 
under the Treaty of Amsterdam, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 687 (2000); Stefan Grundmann, 
Binnenmarktkollisionsrecht—Vom klassischen IPR zur Integrationsordnung, 69 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 457–77 (2000). 
 59. But not exclusively!  See Horatia Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected 
Markets: A Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383, 383–409 (2003). 
 60. See Christian Joerges, The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Per-
ceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective, 3 EUR. L.J. 378, 378–406 (1997); 
ANDREAS FURRER, ZIVILRECHT IM GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTLICHEN KONTEXT: DAS EUROPÄISCHE 
KOLLISIONSRECHT ALS KOORDINIERUNGSINSTRUMENT FÜR DIE EINBINDUNG DES ZIVILRECHTS IN DAS 
EUROPÄISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2002); Marc Amstutz, Zwischenwelten: Zur Emergenz einer 
interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im europäischen Privatrecht, in CHRISTIAN JOERGES & GUNTHER 
TEUBNER, RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT: RECHT-FERTIGUNG ZWISCHEN PRIVATRECHTSDOGMATIK UND 
GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE 213 (2003); Thomas Vesting, Die Staatsrechtslehre und die Veränderung 
ihres Gegenstandes:m Konsequennzen von Europäisierung und Internationalisierung, 63 
VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTASCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 41, 65, 41–70 
(2004); SCHMID, supra note 1, at 371; Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime-Collision: 
The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004). 
 61. See Christian Joerges, Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty, in EUROPE 
AFTER MAASTRICHT: AN EVER CLOSER UNION? 29 (Renaud Dehousse ed., 1994) (detaching the spe-
cific mode of thought in conflict of laws from Private International Law and making it serve other areas 
of law, and in particular a social theory of law, was the great project of Rudolf Wiethölter, Begriffs—
oder Interessenjurisprudenz—falsche Fronten im IPR und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht: Bemerkungen 
zur selbstgerechten Kollisionsnorm, 1977 FESTSCHRIFT KEGEL 223 (1977).  As Gunther Teubner ex-
plains, the point was no longer merely to reflect conflicts between national legal systems theoretically 
and cope with them in practice, but to generalize conflict-of-laws thinking itself in such a way as to 
make it yield results for conflicts between complexes of norms, areas of law and legal institutions, but 
also those between social systems, indeed even for divergences between competing social theories. This 
two-fold recourse to rich historical experience of private international law on the one hand and to com-
peting theories of society on the other managed to establish “conflicts-of-laws” as the central category 
for legal reconstruction of social contradictions.  See Gunther Teubner, Dealing with Paradoxes of Law: 
Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter, in ON PARADOXES AND SELF-REFERENCE IN LAW (Oren Perez & Gun-
ther Teubner eds., 2004). 
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softer alternative to harmonization or unification.  It is a much more radical 
quest to take the nonhierarchical, plural62 (“heterarchical”63) characteristics 
of the European polity seriously.  To anticipate the argument which will be 
developed later64 in more detail: None of Europe’s semiautonomous politi-
cal subunits are empowered with Kompetenz-Kompetenz—the power to de-
termine one’s range of competences—which would be necessary for an au-
thoritative resolution of jurisdictional conflicts.  Equally, and even more 
importantly, the type of conflicts such power has to resolve are not those 
for which private international law scholars suggest their jurisdiction selec-
tion rules (Verweisungsnormen). 
D. A First Outlook into International Relations Theory: The Poverty of 
Methodological Nationalism in Postnational Constellations 
To argue that legal disciplines like private international law and com-
parative law are tied  in their conceptual foundations to the sovereign na-
tion state, is like taking tea to India.  Similarly, it should not come as a sur-
prise that one can identify tendencies in the present debates toward the 
building up of a federal-style of European state in the integration process or 
continuities and analogies with the formation of nation-states.  This is not 
the gist of the argument this article seeks to develop.  That argument is 
more complex, more radical and more constructive.  In a nutshell, there are 
structural reasons for the need to loosen the ties of our discipline with the 
nation-state and to replace that heritage by a different model.  Europe is 
neither an international organization nor a federation but can best be char-
acterized as a multilevel system of governance sui generis,  a concept 
widely used among political scientists.65  I have already referred to this 
analytical concept66 and will come back to it more in the third section of 
this essay.67  I will use it heuristically in the following section as a back-
ground for the analysis of patterns in the Europeanization process.  Only 
 
 62. As argued by Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317 (2002). 
 63. KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, THE THEORY OF AUTOPOIESIS. AN APPROACH TO A BETTER 
UNDERSTANDING OF POST-MODERN LAW: FROM THE HIERARCHY OF NORMS TO THE HETERARCHY OF 
CHANGING PATTERNS OF LEGAL INTER-RELATIONSHIPS (EUI Working Paper Law 99/3, 1999. 
 64. See discussion infra Sections I.D and III.A.2. 
 65. The term was coined by Gary Marks, Lisbeth Hooghe and Kermit Blank in their European 
Integration from the 1980s: State Centric vs. Multi-level Governance, 34 J. COMMON MKT STUD. 341 
(1996).  Its use is by now widespread, if not inflationary.  The contributions to CHRISTIAN JOERGES, ET 
AL. EDS., SYMPOSIUM: MOUNTAIN OR MOLEHILL? A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE COMMISSION WHITE 
PAPER ON GOVERNANCE (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/01). See also infra note 174 on the adapta-
tion of the term by European law scholars (Pernice and Furrer are cited there as examples. 
 66. See discussion supra in the Introductory Remarks. 
 67. See discussion infra III.A. 
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through such analyses can one find out to what degree the model can pro-
vide instructive orientation to lawyers in their interpretation of Europeani-
zation processes.  Even more importantly, only through such concrete 
analyses can one explore normative implications of the re-orientation that 
the multilevel governance model suggests. 
It is my ambition to develop this perspective inductively in the next 
section and to resort to a series of abstract statements.  Europe, so the mul-
tilevel literature suggests, is a case sui generis.  This is but a truism.  
Europe is inherently different from other polities.  The transformations the 
European nation-states have experienced are not in every respect unique, 
and it is important, especially in the presentation of European develop-
ments to a non-European readership, to remain aware of the more general 
features of Europeanization.  Two concepts seem particularly helpful in this 
respect.  One is Jürgen Habermas’s “postnational constellation,” introduced 
in an essay on the contemporary problems of democratic governance.68  
That term and Habermas’s normative concerns are of general importance.  
Constitutional democracies were institutionalized in nation-states and fed-
erations.  Postnational constellations are therefore generally highly ambiva-
lent—as the debates on the European Union’s democracy deficit document.  
The second term I take from Michael Zürn69 who uses it to characterize a 
dilemma and a challenge which is very similar to that of the legal disci-
plines addressed in this essay70—Politics and law are crucial to the effec-
tive functioning of postnational constellations, yet the concepts and theo-
ries they have inherited and learned to work with were formed within 
nation-states or federations.  Zürn underlines three characteristics of the 
postnational constellation: (1) The nation-state is no longer autonomous in 
determining political priorities but must coordinate its policies within the 
 
 68. Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy, in JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 58–112 (2001). 
 69. MICHAEL ZÜRN, THE STATE IN THE POST-NATIONAL CONSTELLATION—SOCIETAL 
DENATIONALIZATION AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, ARENA Working Paper No. 35/1999 (1999); 
Michael Zürn, Politik in der postnationalen Konstellation, in POLITIK IN DER ENTGRENZTEN WELT 181 
(Landfried ed., 2001). 
 70. Similarly, the sociological version of Ulrich Beck is instructive.  “Methodological nationalism 
takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nation-state societies, and sees states 
and their governments as the cornerstone of social-scientific analysis.”  Ulrich Beck, Toward a New 
Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent, CONSTELLATIONS, 10:4, at 453 (2003).  Beck distinguishes 
further between methodological and normative nationalism. “In a normative sense, nationalism means 
that every nation has the right to self-determination within the frame of its cultural distinctiveness.”  Id. 
at 454.  He emphasizes the blurring of the “boundaries between political, moral and social communi-
ties.”  Id. at 455.  Such processes mean, so he goes on to argue, that we can no longer rely in our analy-
ses on “national organization as a structural principle of societal and political action.”  Id. at 456.  In-
stead, we must search for and identify with a “cosmopolitan perspective”—the equivalent of a 
“methodological universalism.”  Passim. 
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framework of international institutions; (2) national political actors must 
strive for recognition beyond their national constituencies as their practices 
are increasingly exposed to evaluation at international level; and (3) the na-
tion-state retains significant resources which are indispensable for an im-
plementation of internationally agreed-upon policies. 
The scheme points to developments which do not just affect the Mem-
ber States of the European Union but are of general importance—even 
though they may be experienced less intensively in the United States than 
in Norway, for instance.  Zürn’s operationalization of the postnational con-
stellation is particularly helpful for legal analyses because he makes us 
aware of the interactions and interdependences that affect political proc-
esses and law-making process within national systems.  Last but not least, 
his scheme helps to overcome the famous schism between functionalist and 
intergovermentalist theories of European integration because it links both 
approaches in a plausible way. 
E. A Preliminary Step Towards a Legal Conceptualization of the Europe-
anization Process 
“Multilevel governance” and “methodological nationalism” are not le-
gal concepts—we cannot rely on them as “objectively valid” restatements 
of “the reality,” or “apply” them in legal conceptualizations and reasoning. 
Their import into the world of law requires their reconstruction in the in-
troduction of normative dimensions into analytical concepts.  Zürn’s cri-
tique of methodological nationalism is a step in that direction because Zürn 
pleads for a new orientation for both politics and policymaking.  What I 
suggest is a step towards a reconstruction of the legal dimension of the 
European polity—to start with a suggestion submitted some time ago.71  
The national systems of private law have all found responses to the ten-
sions between economic efficiency, functional necessities and the norma-
tive commitments of welfare states—and the legitimacy of these responses 
is generally unquestioned.  European integration exposes these systems to 
new exigencies, namely that of market integration which was the main ob-
jective of the European Economic Community and was both an indispensa-
ble prerequisite and a crucial element of Europe’s harmonization policies.  
Europeanization as a process can therefore be characterized by a funda-
mental tension: The European project of market integration started to im-
 
 71. See Christian Joerges & Gert Brüggemeier, Europäisierung des Vertrags und Haftungsrechts, 
in GEMEINSAMES PRIVATRECHT IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT (Peter-Christian Müller-Graff 
ed., 1993).  See also IRENE KLAUER, DIE EUROPÄISIERUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS—DER EUGH ALS 
ZIVILRICHTER (1998); SCHMID, supra note 1, at 362. 
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pose its functionalist logic on the private law systems of the Member 
States, their various legal traditions, and visions of private law justice.  The 
tension could neither be resolved by the replacement of European law by a 
supranational equivalent of nation-state law; nor can national law be re-
placed by European exercises in market building.  Such exercises may re-
sult in disintegrative effects—or trigger innovative developments within 
national systems.  Such risks and potentials are explored in the following 
section.  This analysis remains a useful starting point, however, it must be 
refined mainly because the integration project has continuously widened in 
scope.  It has increasingly affected national systems, which in turn have 
learned to develop more sophisticated responses to these external legal 
stimuli.  The brief references to these two non-legal categories—
“multilevel governance” and “methodological nationalism”—suffice to 
substantiate this observation a step further: It follows from the characteriza-
tion of the European Union as a multilevel system of governance and from 
the disaggregation of formerly integrated national competences that the 
tensions between the functionalist logic of integration and the normative 
logic inherent in national legal systems cannot be resolved by the building 
up of a hierarchy within which a “higher” European level could exert com-
prehensive control over national law.  That is a complex formula for a clear 
message and a compelling logic: The European Union is no unitary state 
and no federation.  It is composed of semiautonomous units, which have 
become interdependent.  These units are not subject to comprehensive su-
pranational authority.  The common interest in, and commitments to, the 
building up of a functioning market has continuously to be balanced with 
the normative preferences legitimized in the national legal systems.  It fur-
ther follows from the “heterarchical” nature of the European Union that we 
cannot expect its law to achieve the same type and the same degree of co-
herence we seek to achieve in the legal systems of unitary polities. 
II.  THE PRACTICE OF EUROPEANIZATION:  
THREE EXEMPLARY PATTERNS 
Europeanization cannot be expected to reproduce a system of private 
law equivalent in its comprehensiveness and consistency to that of the Con-
tinental civil code systems.  What else will emerge out of the interaction 
and tensions between the functionalist logic of market integration and the 
normative logic of preference formation in national legal systems?  This 
question has an empirical and a normative dimension, and both are con-
tested.  As a first approximation to the state of the debate on the objectives 
of Europeanization and of the best means to achieve them, we can look 
again at the contest of legal disciplines and read their disciplinary ap-
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proaches as both a description of the Europeanization process and a cure to 
the failures they perceive.  We then become aware that their contest is 
linked to an ancillary agenda, namely a contest over the structuring of the 
emerging European polity which takes place between—but also within—
the individual disciplines.  To rephrase the perceptions and positions al-
ready mentioned: 
1. Europeanization is about to destroy the systematic coherence of 
private law. This is a widely shared concern, particularly in Ger-
many.72  One cure to that problem is to replace national laws with 
a European law more systematically, i.e., to proceed from the 
limited  interventions characteristic of Europeanization thus far, 
to a more comprehensive European code.73  An alternative here 
would be to reduce European legislative activities, defend na-
tional legal cultures and organize cooperation via private interna-
tional law.74 
2. Europeanization, like globalization, fosters deregulation, privati-
zation and regulatory competition, an assessment that can lead to 
two competing conclusions.  While (some) proponents of the 
“European social model” seek to defend the social dimensions of 
private law with the help of a European code,75 proponents of 
economic efficiency argue that Europeanization has the potential 
of modernizing and rationalizing European private law, not just 
because it values individual freedoms so highly, but because the 
exercise of these freedoms will trigger processes of regulatory 
competition.76 
Whose perception is correct?  Which normative options are open?  Which 
perception deserves support?  It seems worth noting at the outset that 
“methodological nationalism” requires orchestrating the concert of voices 
 
 72. See supra note 16. 
 73. See supra notes 18 and 19. 
 74. See supra note 54. 
 75. See UGO MATTEI, THE EUROPEAN CODIFICATION PROCESS—CUT AND PASTE 107–28 (2003); 
Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS, Vol. 2: No. 1 (2002), available at 
www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss1/art1 (last  visited Sept.1, 2004). 
 76. Out of a steady growing body of literature see Simon Deakin, Two Types of Regulatory Com-
petition: Competitive Federalism versus Reflexive Harmonisation: A Law and Economics Perspective 
on Centros, 2 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. L. 231 (1999); EVA-MARIA KIENINGER, WETTBEWERB DER 
PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNGEN (2003); Jan Smits, How to predict the differences in uniformity between 
different areas of a future European private law? An evolutionary approach, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
HARMONIZING EUROPEAN LAW 50–70 (Alain Marciano & Lean-Michel Josselin eds., 2002); Gerhard 
Wagner, The Economics of Harmonisation: The Case of Contract Law, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 995 
(2002). 
FINAL JOERGES.DOC 3/8/2005  9:42 AM 
2004] THE CHALLENGES OF EUROPEANIZATION IN THE REALM OF PRIVATE LAW 169 
just described—and it might be that the Europeanization process is not 
adequately represented by any of these voices. 
How can one determine whether this is so?  There is certainly no way 
to describe the Europeanization process comprehensively.  What seems 
possible and instructive, however, is to explore patterns of this process to 
which we can ascribe exemplary importance.  This is indeed the thrust of 
the following case studies.  Each relates to a distinct link between European 
law and national law.  The first example from the field of product liability 
law concerns a field in which the European legislature has been active, 
providing an excellent example of an encounter between European (supra-
national) and national private law.  The second example is drawn from the 
field of company law and concerns the impact of European primary law on 
national legal systems.  The third example addresses the tensions between 
European policies in the field privatization of public services and national 
distributive policies, more technically speaking between European state aid 
law, a section of the Treaty chapter on competition policy, and regulatory 
arrangements at the national level.  The exemplary quality of these three 
types of conflicts seems obvious, however, one must be cautious when 
evaluating the results reached in each of the cases—while the language of 
European law is seemingly compelling doctrinal logic, its messages are 
much more indeterminate and ambivalent. 
A. Product Liability Law: The Poverty of Orthodox Supranationalism 
Consumer protection used to be perceived as the flagship of Europe-
anization.  The European Community, so often described and criticized as 
building up its common market through strategies of “negative” integration 
(the abolition of legal provisions impeding free trade) entered the field of 
private law through the promotion of a “social” private law, promoting a 
field unknown or marginal in some states, of dubious reputation in others. 
The frontlines seemed clear: On the one side, the European Community, 
promoting directives on consumer protection,77 unfortunately constrained 
by the unanimity rule of Article 100, but advised and encouraged by a 
transnational epistemic community of consumer law advocates; on the 
other side, the defenders of the unity or normative coherence of the national 
private law system, complaining about such interventions, questioning the 
Community’s competence78 and questioning the validity of the argument 
 
 77. The author, promoter and defender of the directive, however, was prudent enough to downplay 
the consumer protection objective. Cf. Hans C. Taschner, Die künftige Produzntenhaftung in 
Deutschland, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 611 (1986). 
 78. See with regard to the product liability directive, Bodo Börner, Die Produkthaftung oder das 
vergessene Gemeinschaftsrecht, in EUROPÄEISCHE GERICHTSBARKEIT UND NATIONALE 
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that uniform rules of consumer protection would enhance the quality of 
competitive processes. 
1. The ECJ Judgments of April 25, 2002 on the Product Liability 
Directive.  The Directive 85/374/EEC79 on Product Liability was widely 
considered to be a piece of legislation with many defects.  It harmonized 
only a small segment of product liability law.80  Its standard of consumer 
protection seemed generally unimpressive.81  Critics, skeptics and defend-
ers agreed, however, as to its efficacy, tending to characterize it as quite 
marginal legislation that would neither do much good nor much harm.  This 
conclusion seemed to be well-founded in view of Article 13 which pro-
vided that the Directive did “not preclude the application of other systems 
of contractual or non-contractual liability based on other grounds, such as 
fault or a warranty in respect of latent defects” and hence did not affect na-
tional tort law.82  It was also understood that consumer protection provi-
sions should be viewed as minimum standards which would not preempt 
the adoption of more stringent rules by national legislatures.83 
These views were well established from 1985 until, to the surprise of 
most observers, the ECJ, in three judgments handed down on April 25, 
2002,84 assigned a new importance to what had been to that point a dormant 
directive through a doctrinally bold move—in the Court’s view, the Com-
munity legislature had not merely laid down minimum standards, but in-
stead aimed at a “complete harmonization” of its provisions on the com-
pensation of consumers.  The term “complete harmonization” is an element 
of the supremacy doctrine.  That doctrine would be weakened substantially 
 
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT: FESTSCHRIFT ZUM 70: GEBURTSTAG VON HANS KUTSCHER 43 
(1981). 
 79. Council Directive 85/374/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29. 
 80. Cf. H. Koch, Internationale Produkthaftung uznd Grenzen der Rechtsangleichung durch die 
EG-Richtlinie, 152 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDSELS UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 537 (1988). 
 81. Cf. Gert Brüggemeier & Norbert Reich, Die EG-Produkthftungsrichtlinie 1985 und ihr 
Verhältnis zur Produzentenhaftung nach Paragraph 823 Abs. 1 BGB, WERTPAPIER MITTEILUNGEN 149 
(1986). 
 82. Gert Brüggemeier, Produkthaftung und Produktsicherheit, 152 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS 
GESAMTE HANDELS UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 511, 531 (1988). 
 83. Had the Directive been adopted after the Single European Act and accordingly based on Arti-
cle 100(a) (now 95), then the adoption of more stringent standards (subject to the procedure laid down 
in Sections 4 and 5 of that provision) would have been possible.  The Advocate General Geelhoed was 
able to bring the orthodox understanding of supremacy and pre-emption to bear.  See his Conclusions in 
Case C-154/00, para. 4; Case C-52/00, para. 14 and Case C-183/00, para. 27.  The ECJ followed suit.  
See Case C-154/00, para. 10; Case C-52/00, para. 14, Case C- 183/00. 
 84. Case C-52/00, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. I-3827; Case C-183/00, María Victoria 
González Sánchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA, 2002 E.C.R. I-3901; Case C-154/00, Commission v. 
Greece, 2002 E.C.R. I-3879. 
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if national law could adopt provisions deviating from primary European 
law (Treaty provisions) or from secondary law (acts adopted in the Com-
munity legislative process).  The doctrine of preemption is a quasilogical 
implication—where the Community legislature has “occupied” a field, the 
Member States can no longer pursue deviating policies. 
The views on the limited reach of the Product Liability Directive were 
not just shared by advocates of consumer protection.  The most important 
reason militating in favor of a narrow interpretation stems from the dynam-
ics of general tort law and the interdependencies of product liability in tort 
law with contract law and product safety law.  The ECJ would only very 
occasionally have an opportunity to develop its views on the Directive.  It 
seemed reasonable to conclude that an ossification of the whole field might 
follow from any extensive interpretation of the effects of the directive on 
national law. 85 
Indeed, such fears seem cogent in light of the ECJ’s three new prod-
ucts liability judgments.  The decision concerning Spanish law86 seems par-
ticularly troubling.87  In Medicina Asturiana SA, Maria Sanchez, the plain-
tiff, required a blood transfusion in the hospital run by the defendant 
institution.  As a consequence of the transfusion, she was infected with the 
Hepatitis C virus.  She based her action on the law by which Spain had 
transposed the Directive into Spanish law and, in addition, on the general 
liability provisions of Spanish civil law and on the Spanish General Law 
for the Protection of Consumers and Users of July 19, 1984, under which 
the claimant had only to prove damage and a causal connection.  Under the 
Product Liability Directive, implemented ten years after the 1984 Law,88 
she also had to prove that the hospital had produced the blood conserves at 
issue, which she failed to show.  Therefore, the success of her claim de-
pended on the relationship between the three legal bases.  Article 13 of the 
Directive provides that the Directive “shall not affect any rights which an 
injured person may have according to the rules of the law of contractual or 
non-contractual liability or a special liability system existing at the moment 
 
 85. Brüggemeier, supra note 82, at 531. 
 86. C-183/00, María Victoria González Sánchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA, 2002 E.C.R. I-03901; 
Marie-Eve Arbour, Compensation for Damage Caused by Defective Drugs: European Private Law be-
tween Safety Requirements and Free-Market Values, 10 EUR. L.J.   87 (2004); Schmid, supra note 5, es-
pecially Part 2, Section 4, Ch. 5. 
 87. The two parallel decisions concerned the conformity of transpositions going beyond its stan-
dards of protection with the Directive: Greece had wanted to spare its citizens from the personal contri-
bution of €500 provided for in Article 9 I (b) of the Directive.  Case C-183/00, para. 8.  France wanted 
to hold the distributor liable alongside the manufacturer, and, additionally, to restrict the exemptions 
from liability foreseen in Article 7 of the Directive.  Case C-52/00, para. 6. 
 88. Case C-183/00, Medicina Asturiana SA, 2002 E.C.R. I-3901, at paras. 7, 8. 
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when this Directive is notified.”  Does this mean, the Spanish court asked 
the ECJ, that the Directive could “be interpreted as precluding the restric-
tion or limitation, as a result of transposition of the Directive, of rights 
granted to consumers under the legislation of the Member State?”89 To the 
unversed reader, the question may sound rhetorical. But the Court re-
sponded: 
“[. . .]Article 13 of the Directive cannot be interpreted as giving the 
Member States the possibility of maintaining a general system of product 
liability different from that provided for in the Directive.”90. . . The pro-
vision that Article 13 does not affect claims on a different basis cannot 
“be relied on in such a case in order to justify the maintenance in force of 
national provisions affording greater protection than those of the Direc-
tive”.91 
In its analysis of the Community law provisions, the ECJ refers to Re-
cital 1 in the preamble of the Directive, according to which “approximation 
is necessary because legislative divergences may distort competition and 
affect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a dif-
fering degree of protection of the consumer against damage caused by a de-
fective product to his health or property.”92  It had been necessary at the 
time to introduce this sentence, in order to “establish” the Community’s 
(functional) legislative competence.  Since then, the paragraph has become 
neither more empirically relevant, nor normatively more correct.  Neverthe-
less, the Court’s judgment reaffirmed its value as a virtually teleological 
motivation for restricting Member States’ legislative autonomy.93 
2. Critique.  The style of reasoning of the ECJ is often formalistic 
for many reasons, among them the precarious legitimacy of the Court.  Is 
formalism a plausible strategy and normatively sound response to queries 
as to the Court’s legitimacy?  Should the commentators of the Court seek to 
protect it by submitting restrictive interpretations of the judgment?  The 
annotations to the judgment are in disagreement.  A German commentator, 
in a very comprehensive and careful analysis,94 suggests that the ECJ’s in-
trusion into product liability law should be read as preempting not just na-
tional transformations of the Directive, but also tort law more generally.  
 
 89. Id. at para. 13. 
 90. Id. at  para. 30. 
 91. Id. at para. 33. 
 92. Id. at para. 3. 
 93. Id. at paras. 24, 25. 
 94. Renate Schaub, Abschied vom nationalen Produkthaftungsrecht? Anspruch und Wirklichkeit 
der EG-Produkthaftung—Zugleich Besprechung der Urteile des EuGH vom 25. 4. 2002, Rs. C-52/00, 
C-154/00 und C-183/00, in 2003 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT III 541-589 (2003). 
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While the doctrinal or conceptual basis of European strict liability is not 
clear, what is clear is the ECJ’s harmonization objective.  As a result, na-
tional courts must now turn to the ECJ and submit questions of tort law to 
it.  This can be argued under the acte claire and supremacy doctrine.  Ac-
cording to this tandem, national courts must ask the ECJ for clarification 
wherever the meaning of European concepts seem ambiguous.  In this way 
the system seeks to ensure the uniformity of law in Europe. “What a civil 
law fantasy!” common law lawyers may tend to think.  Or perhaps they 
would characterize this as a pure nightmare?  If these doctrines were ap-
plied extensively, they could potentially increase the burden of the ECJ 
enormously.  This would imply that the Court would get increasingly in-
volved in the adjudication of issues which it is not well prepared and 
equipped to address.  Indeed, the majority of the annotations to the ECJ’s 
intrusion into product liability law criticize the court for not exercising 
more restraint.95 
It seems absolutely unlikely that national courts will abstain from de-
veloping their product liability law further and impose upon the litigating 
parties the burdens and references to the Directive that the ECJ judgments 
apparently require.  At the same time, it seems equally implausible that the 
ECJ will pursue a strategy of expanding its reach to include ever more re-
sponsibilities—especially responsibilities over such a complex and con-
tested area.  Given that the Product Liability Directive is based upon now 
outdated Treaty provisions, the chances for a more prudent exercise of ju-
dicial powers seems likely, although such comments cannot explain, let 
alone justify, the Court’s revival of the language of orthodox supranational-
ism. 
B. Company Law: The Transformation of Economic Freedoms into Po-
litical Rights 
The ECJ’s Centros judgment96 is to be regarded as its most impor-
tant—and certainly its most debated—holding since the legendary Cassis 
de Dijon decision of 1979.97  Expectations of the subsequent Überseering98 
 
 95. G. Viney, L’Interprétation par la CJCE de la Directive du 25 Juillet 1985 sur la Responsbilité 
du Fait des Produits Défectueux, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, 2002, I 177, No. 44-45, 1945-1948 (2002); 
Jean Calais-Auloy, Menace européene sur la jurisprudence francaise concernant l’obligation de 
sécurité du vendeur professionel, RECUEIL LE DALLOZ, No. 31, at 1458 (2002); A. Palmieri & R. 
Pardolesi, Difetti del prodotto e del diritto privato europeo, IL FORO ITALIANO, 125, IV, at 296 (2002).  
See also Marie-Eve Arbour, supra note 86, and Schmid, supra note 5. 
 96. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459. 
 97. Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon , 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
 98. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH 
(NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-9919. 
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and, soon thereafter, Inspire Art99 judgments were correspondingly tense.  
So much has been written about these judgments100 that any comprehensive 
presentation of the debate could easily fill a book.  The purpose, however, 
for which this recent jurisprudence will be analyzed in this essay is both 
limited and specific.  Its focus is an analysis of the law-generating process, 
in which individuals and companies exercising their economic freedoms 
under national and European legislation, and both national and European 
courts, participate and interact.  This analysis will defend three theses: (1) 
The ECJ’s company law case law has effectively transformed economic 
freedoms into the rights of political participation; (2) the ECJ’s jurispru-
dence is not exposing company law to the logic of economic processes but 
rather strives towards a “juridification” of regulatory competition; and (3) 
the theoretical and practical challenge of these law-generating processes 
stems from their “constitutional” importance.  A constitutionalization of the 
European Union, which seeks to ensure the legitimacy of its law production 
must turn its attention to the quality of these processes. 
1. Centros.  The judgment in Centros concerns the core of all the 
European legal rules and principles (the famous acquis communautaire), 
namely, the freedoms of market citizens, which apply directly and ought, 
therefore, to take primacy over national law.  Moreover, the decision 
counts as an extension and strengthening of a perception that has deeply 
penetrated the legal consciousness and awareness of economic law as it is 
held to serve so-called negative integration, because the directly applicable 
freedoms can be invoked by European citizens when asking for review of 
the content of national law by the ECJ.  Through such reviews, national 
laws can be exposed to “regulatory competition.”  These perceptions of 
Centros have their fundamentum in re, but they neglect important dimen-
sions. 
As so often occurs, the facts of this cause célèbre were quite trivial.101  
A Danish married couple, Marianne and Tony Bryde, wished to import 
wine into Denmark but hoped to save the fee of DK200,000 (approximately 
€28,000) that Denmark requires for the registration of companies.  They 
 
 99. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 
2003 E.C.R. I-10155. 
 100. A Celex search on March 25, 2002 indicated 112 commentaries.  That figure was too modest, 
for it did not take into account, for instance, HARALD HALBHUBER, LIMITED COMPANY STATT GMBH? 
EUROPARECHTLICHER RAHMEN UND DEUTSCHER WIDERSTAND—EIN BEITRAG ZUR AUSLEGUNG VON 
ART. 48 EG UND ZUM EUROPÄISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (2001). 
 101. The following owes much to BARBARA TREFIL, CENTROS UND DIE NIEDERLASSUNGSFREIHEIT 
VON GESELLSCHAFTEN IN EUROPA (European University Institute Working Paper Law No. 2003/9), 
available at http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-9.pdf (last visited May 38, 2004). 
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founded a private limited company in the United Kingdom in May of 1992 
with a “seat” at the home of English friends—the now legendary Centros 
Ltd.—and set up a subsidiary in Copenhagen.  None of these steps required 
the capital investment they would have required in their home state of 
Denmark.102 
The Danish authorities refused registration, arguing that the only rea-
son why the Brydes had sought the help of their friends in the United 
Kingdom was to avoid the burdens of Danish law.  The Brydes went to 
court.  Their complaint went through all official channels until it reached 
the highest possible judicial authority, Denmark’s Højesteret.103  The 
Højesteret submitted the question of whether the refusal of registration was 
compatible with the guarantee of freedom of establishment to the ECJ in 
early June 1997.  The ECJ’s decision of March 9, 1999 read: 
It is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty for a Member State to 
refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the 
law of another Member State in which it has its registered office but in 
which it conducts no business where the branch is intended to enable the 
company in question to carry on its entire business in the state in which 
that branch is to be created, while avoiding the need to form a company 
there, thus evading application of the rules governing the formation of 
companies which, in that state, are more restrictive as regards the paying 
up of a minimum share capital.104 
2. Discussion.  The ECJ decision was read by some105 as cautiously 
continuing its earlier interpretations of freedom of establishment.106  Others 
 
 102. Their conduct is interpreted with this degree of severity by Germany’s maître penseur of pri-
vate international law, Gerhard Kegel in an editorial in Europäisches Wirtschafts und Steuerrecht, Heft 
8, 1999.  Gerhard Kegel, Es ist was faul im Staate  Dänemark… (There is Something Rotten in the State 
of Denmark), EUROPÄISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS UND STEUERRECHT HEFT, Sept. 8, 1999, editorial. 
 103. Case C-212/97, para. 13: “Is it compatible with Article 52 of the EC Treaty, in conjunction 
with Articles 56 and 58 thereof, to refuse registration of a branch of a company which has its registered 
office in another Member State and has been lawfully founded with company capital of GBP 100 (ap-
proximately DKK 1 000) and exists in conformity with the legislation of that Member State, where the 
company does not itself carry on any business but it is desired to set up the branch in order to carry on 
the entire business in the country in which the branch is established, and where, instead of incorporating 
a company in the latter Member State, that procedure must be regarded as having been employed in 
order to avoid paying up company capital of not less than DKK 200 000 (at present DKR 125 000)?” 
 104. Sentence 1 of the tenor of the Judgment, 1999 E.C.R. I- 1947. 
 105. Completeness can scarcely be achieved by portraying the range of opinions.  For  a specific 
discussion of the response in Germany, see Harald Halbhuber, National Doctrinal Structures and Euro-
pean Company Law, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1385 (2001).  A very comprehensive survey on the 
overall development of company law from an outsider’s perspective is offered by Jan Wouters, Euro-
pean Company Law: Quo Vadis?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 257 (2000).  For a more topical discus-
sion, see TREFIL, supra note 101. 
 106. Case C-79/85, Segers v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en Verzekeringswesen, 
Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen, 1986 E.C.R. 2375. 
FINAL JOERGES.DOC 3/8/2005  9:42 AM 
176 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:149 
maintained that the ECJ was radicalizing its jurisprudence in a questionable 
fashion.107  Substantial energies were spent on the reconstruction of the 
case in the terms of a discipline the ECJ tends to neglect persistently—did 
“incorporation theory” (Gründungstheorie)108 trump the “company seat 
principle” (Sitztheorie)109 with the help of the ECJ,110 or did the judgment 
respect diversity in the European Union at the expense of the proper 
choice-of-law principle?  Had not the ECJ just confirmed its respect for 
private international law in general and the seat in particular in its Daily 
Mail111 decision?112 A considerable number of commentators saw the ECJ 
as opening the road to regulatory competition, suggesting the potential for 
Delaware effects in Europe—anathema to adherents of the seat theory.113 
Does it make sense to interpret the reasoning of the ECJ in the light of 
a discipline the court does not consider?  The answer to that question de-
pends upon the problem and the context of the problem the Court seeks to 
resolve.  Could a decision on the merits of the two competing theories be a 
constructive contribution to the Europeanization of company law?  That 
field is characterized by endless efforts to harmonize statutory law, to live 
 
 107. Ernst Steindorff, Centros und das Recht auf die günstigste Rechtsordnung, 1999 
JURISTENZEITUNG 1140. 
 108. According to the law of all common law and some continental jurisdictions, the corporate law 
governing the internal affairs of a given corporation is the law of the place of incorporation 
(Gründung)—a very convenient doctrine for an expansionist economy like that of imperial England, 
comment the critics. 
 109. According to the theory traditionally dominating the (European) Continent, the effective seat 
doctrine—“Sitz” or “siège reel”—the internal affairs of a corporation are to be governed by the national 
law of the state where its effective seat is located.  This doctrine is based on the assumption the seat 
jurisdiction has the most contact with the business of the company and should protect the what is re-
garded there as a  public interest. 
 110. See, e.g., Peter Behrens, Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem Centros-Urteil des 
EuGH, 19 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 323 (1999).  This was the 
question the Federal High Court submitted to the ECJ on May 25, 2000 in the Uberseering decision.  
See discussion infra II.B.3. 
 111. Case C-81/87, The Queen/Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily 
Mail and General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483.  At stake in this case was the compatibility with Euro-
pean law of an English tax law requiring the consent of the Treasury before a resident corporation could 
move its headquarters out of the country.  This served precisely the purpose to tax gains that had ac-
crued while the company was a resident of the UK. 
 112. See, e.g., Werner Ebke, Das Schicksal der Sitztheorie nach dem Centros-Urteil des EuGH, 
1999 JURISTENZEITUNG 656; Peter Kindler, Niederlassungsfreiheit für Scheinauslandsgesellschaften? 
Die Centros-Entscheidung des EuGH und das inernationale Privatrecht, 52 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT 1993 (1999); Wulf-Henning Roth, Case Note, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 147 (2000). 
 113. The “Delaware effect” denotes the move of companies into the legal regime most convenient 
to them, the (in)famous “race to the bottom.”  It was especially paragraph 20 in Advocate General La 
Pergola’s opinion that inspired this sort of interpretation.  See Matthias Baudisch, From Status to Con-
tract? An American Perspective on Recent Developments in European Company Law, in THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND GOVERNANCE 24, 44 (Francis Snyder ed., 2003). 
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with German sensitivities over their codetermination legislation and to en-
able economic actors to do business in an integrating market.  Would it be a 
constructive contribution of the ECJ to confirm that the believers in incor-
poration theory should proceed with their principle while the defenders of 
the seat theory should continue to insist on the application of the laws of 
the “real seat” of a company?  I cannot see why the ECJ should have 
thought along such lines.  The manner in which the ECJ considered the 
conduct of the Bryde couple in Centros seems to be focused instead on 
what it means to be a Dane and a European citizen: European law, proffers 
the criticism of the ECJ’s decision, has no business interfering with a 
purely internal Danish matter and the Brydes, who were pursuing no busi-
ness interests in England, ought to have bowed to their home sovereign.  
But are the Brydes only Danes?  The ECJ does not think so, stressing there 
is nothing in itself abusive when a citizen of a Member State founds a 
company in accordance with the laws of another Member State’s provi-
sions which are more favorable for him.  According to the ECJ, this is  
simply a matter of right: 
That being so, the fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to 
set up a company chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of 
company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up branches in 
other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of 
establishment.  The right to form a company in accordance with the law 
of a Member State and to set up branches in other Member States is in-
herent in the exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment 
guaranteed by the Treaty. 114 
As Ernst Steindorff has critically observed, this argument seems to be es-
tablishing, a “right to the most favourable legal system.”115 If this were so, 
the ECJ could indeed be interpreted as pursuing a strategy of “negative” in-
tegration, of exposing national legislatures to a regulatory competition or-
chestrated by private actors or of sending Europe on the road to Delaware.  
But the ECJ’s message is more complex—it did not question in principle 
the competence of Denmark to impose regulatory requirements on both its 
own and foreign citizens and companies.  Indeed, this argument expressly 
confirmed that “a Member State is entitled to take measures designed to 
prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights 
created by the Treaty, improperly to circumvent their national legislation or 
to prevent individuals from improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of 
provisions of Community law.”116  
 
 114. Case C-212/97, Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at para. 27. 
 115. Steindorff, supra note 107. 
 116. According to Case C-212/97, Centros: “[A]ccording to the Court’s case-law, national meas-
ures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
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 Yet the Court insisted that such regulatory restrictions be based on 
good grounds of public interest.  European law does not push Danish law 
aside, but rather places it under pressures of justification.  It was this pres-
sure that Denmark could not stand up to—it could not explain how its 
statutory requirements would achieve the protection of creditors which 
was, according to the Danish government’s presentation, their very objec-
tive.  In essence, the ECJ acted as a constitutional court in the Centros case 
in that it assumed the right to test Danish law according to whether it re-
spected rights guaranteed at the European level.  Even so, the constraints 
imposed on Denmark’s sovereignty were limited, and Denmark soon made 
use of its retained autonomy by adopting a new regulation requiring that 
companies that wish to do business in Denmark and who maintain their 
main administrative center there, either deposit DK110,000 with the Danish 
bank authorities in the form of cash, government bonds or bank guarantees 
(which in the event of insolvency serve exclusively to meet tax demands), 
or provide proof that minimum assets of at least DK125,000 are avail-
able.117 
Have the Danes simply put new gloss on the old provisions?  Some 
Danish commentators think so.118 In its judgment of February 3, 2002, the 
Danish Supreme Court was silent on the issue of Centros’ tax liability; it 
simply reprimanded that the forms had not been completed correctly.119  
What, then, is so “rotten”—in the state of Denmark and elsewhere?120 
 
Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be 
justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the at-
tainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it . . . .”  Id. at para. 34.  “Those conditions are not fulfilled in the case in the main proceedings. 
First, the practice in question is not such as to attain the objective of protecting creditors which it pur-
ports to pursue since, if the company concerned had conducted business in the United Kingdom, its 
branch would have been registered in Denmark, even though Danish creditors might have been equally 
exposed to risk.”  Id. at para. 35.  “Since the company concerned in the main proceedings holds itself 
out as a company governed by the law of England and Wales and not as a company governed by Danish 
law, its creditors are on notice that it is covered by laws different from those which govern the forma-
tion of private limited companies in Denmark and they can refer to certain rules of Community law 
which protect them, such as the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 
54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies . . . , and the Eleventh 
Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 1989 concerning disclosure requirements in respect of 
branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of another 
State . . . .”  Id. at para. 36 (citations omitted). 
 117. See TREFIL, supra note 101, at 31 (referencing www.retsinfo.dk and a survey of the debate on 
the questionability in European law of the new regulations). 
 118. F. Hansen, From C 212 to L 212—Centros Revisited, 2 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 141, 156 
(2001) (citing “a flagrant violation of Article 43 EU”). 
 119. Ugeskrift for Retsvæn 2002.1079H; Laurits Christensen (Copenhagen) and Hanne B. Jensen 
(Florence) kindly pointed me to the judgment. 
 120. Kegel, supra note 102. 
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Denmark has to justify itself before its own citizens in the forum of the 
ECJ.  It is entitled to pursue its regulatory interests, but it also must show 
that the means that it chooses serve the ends that it pursues.  It must not 
discriminate against foreign citizens and its law should be as Community-
friendly as possible. 
What legal discipline are we dealing with here?  Clearly we are no 
longer in the realm of private international law.  Comparative studies on the 
company law traditions of the EU Member States are certainly instructive, 
but they do not reveal much about the proper design of company law in a 
multilevel system of governance.  Is the Court building a European body of 
company law which would conceivably replace national laws—essentially 
a European company code?  What we are witnessing is a process of law 
production which deals with contested regulatory objectives and the ten-
sions of national and supranational competencies.  Europeanization occurs 
through a European “conflict of laws” which must cope with legal differ-
ences, in an effort to define and maintain Denmark’s political autonomy 
while at the same time protecting rights that European law is granting to all 
Europeans.  How else than through the shaping of procedures in which re-
sponses are required could this be accomplished?  Centros is dealing only 
with segments of company law production, namely the freedom of estab-
lishment and it effectively proceduralizes this right. The Brydes have not 
acquired the “right” to replace Danish law by some other law that they find 
more pleasant.  Rather, they have the right to initiate a process in which 
Denmark must justify its regulatory measures.  It is precisely this reshaping 
of economic freedoms as rights to political participation where the constitu-
tional core of the decision lies.  This interaction is novel in that it bridges 
different levels of governance, yet it seems more familiar when contrasted 
with the interaction of private rights and the political sphere in constitu-
tional democracies.  Private autonomy and political rights, so Jürgen 
Habermas has continually argued since his seminal Between Facts and 
Norms,121 must be conceived as two co-original positions.122  What does 
this mean in the European context?  According to the Centros judgment, it 
means that a Danish citizen can bring his sovereign to court with the argu-
ment that the latter lacks justification for denying him the exercise of his 
rights in accordance with the regulatory schemes approved by other Mem-
ber States. 
 
 121. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 82, 133 (1998). 
 122. Cf. his recent restatement in Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Un-
ion of Contradictory Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766, 766–81.  See also Jürgen Habermas, Why 
Europe needs a Constitution?, in ERIK O. ERIKSEN ET AL., DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 
19 (2004), also available at http://www.iue.it/RSC/EU/Reform02(uk).pdf (last visited May 28, 2004). 
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3. Überseering and Inspire Art.  Centros produced dramatic effects 
at two levels.  It was foreseeable that interested actors would test the 
strength of their legal positions to explore possibilities to save capital by 
establishing businesses in the United Kingdom, although little systematic 
sociological research has been undertaken so far to ascertain the true ef-
fect.123  The debate in Centros concerned the interpretation of the new legal 
situation and the discussion of the next steps the ECJ would take.  These 
steps were illuminating—and they may initiate a less doctrinal but more 
constructive turn in the Europeanization debate. 
In a decision of March 30, 2000124 the German Federal High Court 
submitted the question to the ECJ of whether German law is incompatible 
with the EC Treaty if it prevents a Dutch company from pursuing its claims 
against a German defendant in a German court.  This is a possible proce-
dural implication of Germany’s seat theory.  According to Section 50(1) of 
the German Civil Procedures Act (Zivilprozessordnung), locus standi of 
companies in German courts is dependant upon their competence to act le-
gally (Rechtsfähigkeit).  In the present case, the plaintiff Überseering had 
moved the center of its activities from the Netherlands to Germany.  The 
plaintiff sought to bring an action against the defendant, a German com-
pany, which sought compensation for defective work carried out by the 
company.  Because a company incorporated according to Dutch law could 
essentially lose its legal capacity once it transferred its “seat” (Verwal-
tungssitz), such a company was essentially forced to reregister in Ger-
many.125  In an internal market, such legal principles seem downright in-
credible. 
German law is not quite that rigid, however.  As Advocate General 
Colomer noted in his opinion, the German government had argued in the 
oral hearings that a company in the plaintiff’s position could, in fact, con-
tinue to assert its rights under German law,126 and that, in German law, 
Überseering’s passive locus standi continued to exist despite the new 
 
 123. Matthias Baudisch argues that firms will not so easily risk their reputation by engaging in a 
“race to the bottom” in an analysis that is not sociological but nonetheless extremely informative.  Mat-
thias Baudisch, From Status to Contract? An American Perspective on Recent Developments in Euro-
pean Company Law, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GOVERNANCE, 24, 44 (Francis Snyder ed., 2003).  
See also Catherine Holst, European Company Law after Centros: Is the EU on the Road to Delaware? 
8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 323–41 (2002). 
 124. BGH: Rechtsfähigkeit niederländischer Gesellschaft bei Verwaltungssitzverlagerung, 11 
EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 412 (2000). 
 125. Cf. para. 45 in Advocate General Colomer’s opinion in Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. 
Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-09919. 
 126. Id. at para. 55. 
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“seat” of the company.127  Despite this apparent way out of the dilemma, 
the ECJ refrained from using the escape, holding that, “[a] necessary pre-
condition for the exercise of the freedom of establishment is the recognition 
of those companies by any Member State in which they wish to establish 
themselves.”128   
My initial impression was that the ECJ’s reasoning resulted in an un-
necessarily harsh treatment of Germany,129 however in the meantime, the 
ECJ has clarified its position.  In Inspire Art130 it became definitively clear 
that the ECJ sought to provide enhanced guidance for the Europeanization 
process.  Inspire Art was a company incorporated in the United Kingdom 
but which operated exclusively in the Netherlands.  According to the Dutch 
Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen131 (Law on Formally 
Foreign Companies) of December 17, 1997, Inspire Art was required to 
register in the Netherlands and to add that it is a formally foreign company, 
which would nevertheless be subject to Dutch minimum capital and disclo-
sure requirements, as well as provisions on the personal liability of the di-
rectors. 
In its ruling, the Dutch disclosure provisions were held to be incom-
patible with secondary Community law.132 As to the rules on minimum 
capital and the liability of directors, the ECJ concluded “that neither the 
[Dutch] Chamber of Commerce nor the Netherlands Government has ad-
duced any evidence to prove that the measure in question satisfies the crite-
ria of efficacy, proportionality and non-discrimination mentioned. . . .[They 
therefore] cannot be justified under Article 46 EC, or on grounds of pro-
tecting creditors, or combating improper recourse to freedom of establish-
ment or safeguarding fairness in business dealings or the efficiency of tax 
inspections.”133 
What is left of private international law and its competing theories?  
The ECJ’s reference to the rights guaranteed by the Treaty, to the suprem-
acy of secondary legislation over national provisions on the same subject, 
and, last but not least, the subjection of national legislation to European 
 
 127. Id. at para. 46. 
 128. Case C-208/00, Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. at para. 59. 
 129. See CHRISTIAN JOERGES, ON THE LEGITIMACY OF EUROPEANISING PRIVATE LAW: 
CONSIDERATIONS ON A JUSTICE-MAKING LAW FOR THE EU MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM 17 (European Uni-
versity Institute Working Paper Law No. 3003/3, 2003), available at http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-
3.pdf (last visited May 28, 2004); see also SCHMID, supra note 1, at 428. 
 130. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. 
(Judgment of September 30, 2003), available at www.curia.europa.eu. 
 131. Staatsblad 1997, No. 697. 
 132. Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. at paras. 71, 72. 
 133. Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. at paras. 140, 142. 
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standards of reasonableness, provide a Europeanization framework which 
is superior to anything so far conceived under private international law.  
This does not imply that all the objectives which were generally ascribed to 
the seat theory—“requirements relating to the general interest, such as the 
protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees 
and even the taxation authorities”134—would now have been outlawed.  
They remain alive but must be reconsidered and substantiated anew in the 
ECJ’s framework following Inspire Art.135 
Germany’s codetermination law is the most difficult case. What would 
be left of it if subjected to the standard the Court has adopted in Inspire 
Art?136  There are reasons to believe that we need not find an answer to this 
question.  At first blush, codetermination seems to lead us into the kind of 
dilemma that the recent Microsoft decision by the European Commission 
presented137—that a company present in two jurisdictions is subjected to 
the rules of one of them in such a way that the other jurisdiction’s policy is 
subverted, be it de jure or de facto.  Essentially, you either have codetermi-
nation or you don’t.  If Volkswagen operates under a codetermination at 
home and codetermination is considered bad, then all the countries in 
which Volkswagen does business are essentially negatively affected.   
What kind of conceptual framework could help to resolve the socio-
economic Kulturkampf between Germany’s traditions and the rest of the 
world?  Perhaps we should be content with the practices already developed.  
Volkswagen has neither been confronted with requests to give up its com-
mitments to codetermination nor has it threatened to leave the country be-
cause of the burdens codetermination imposes.  Germany has not imposed 
its codetermination laws on pseudoforeign corporations,138 but quite pa-
 
 134. Case C-208/00, Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. at para. 92. 
 135. Erich Schanze and Andreas Jüttner consider these concerns exaggerated and rather unhelpful 
for the development of a control theory moderated by European law.  Erich Schanze & Andreas Jüttner, 
Annerkennung und Kontrolle ausländischer Gesellschaften. Rechtslage und Perspektiven nach der 
Uberseering-Entscheidung des EuGH, 2003 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT36; Cf. Peter Ulmer, 
Schutzinstrumente gegen die Gefahren aus der Geschäftstätigkeit inländischer Zweigniederlassungen 
von Kapitalgesellschaften mit fiktivem Auslandsbesitz, 54 (13) JURISTENZEITUNG 662 (1999). 
 136. For a comprehensive and thoughtful discussion, see Jens C. Dammann, Note, The Future of 
Codetermination after Centros: Will German Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607 (2003). 
 137. Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Commission Decision of March 24, 2004, COM(04)900 
final, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 138. See Dammann, supra note 136, at 621. 
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tiently sought to find a European framework within which its traditions 
might survive.139 
C. Diagonal Conflicts: “Invasions of the Market”?140 
It is an important characteristic of the integration process that it effec-
tively dissolves the links between private law and its regulatory environ-
ment.141  This disintegrative side-effect is an implication of a fundamental 
constitutional principle of the European construct.  The EU’s competencies 
are restricted to the fields enumerated in the Treaty.  The principle is un-
contested in theory, but it is difficult to apply in practice.  Indeed, real-
world constellations generally do not proceed according to the lines drawn 
by the drafters of the Treaty.  It is typical in the European Union that the 
European level is competent—sometimes even exclusively—to regulate 
one aspect of a problem, whereas Member States remain competent to 
regulate another.  As a result, the term “diagonal conflict” is useful to dis-
tinguish such constellations from “vertical” conflict resolutions where 
Community law trumps national law on the one hand, and from “horizon-
tal” conflicts which arise from differences among the legal systems of 
Member States and belong to the realm of private international law on the 
other. 
Examples are legion. I restrict myself to a discussion of two recent ex-
amples from fields in which the logic of market integration tends to jeop-
ardize the individual policy objectives pursued by Member States.  The ex-
amples concern the extent of private as opposed to public governance. 
They do not deal with rules of private law, but rather an instrumentalization 
of private governance arrangement in the context of public governance. 
The first example addresses environmental policy objectives which have 
not only been tolerated but actively pursued by the Community and the 
second deals with a conflict between European privatization policies and 
national distributive concerns in the field of public services.  Both exam-
ples document the deepening and increasing complexity of the integration 
project.  The old harmonization policies through which the Community ini-
tially sought to ensure the equality and fairness of competitive conditions 
are insufficient when it comes to policies of social and economic regulation 
for which the Member States have retained competence. 
 
 139. For an overview, see Dieter Sadowski, Joachim Junkes & Sabine Lindenthal, The German 
Model of Corporate and Labour Governance, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 33 (2000). 
 140. This term is borrowed from Steven Lukes, Invasions of the Market, in FROM LIBERAL VALUES 
TO DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JÁNOS KIS ch. 4 (Ronald W. Dworkin ed., 2004). 
 141. See Joerges, supra notes 60 and 61. 
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What discipline can the Community exert in such fields?  Can it con-
trol the anticompetitive effects of national regulations?  The complexity 
and normative sensitivity of such issues render the tasks of the ECJ ever 
more difficult.  In principle, European law must respect national or regional 
political preferences—the ECJ evinced such a respect, but only in the sec-
ond example was the Court’s performance truly impressive. 
1. Windmills in Schleswig Holstein.  Germany’s governing coalition 
has a common enemy, a common problem and a common hope.  The com-
mon enemy is atomic energy, the common problem is coal, both black and 
brown, and their hope lies in windmills.  All three industries are heavily 
subsidized.  The government’s hope, however, is that the energy gained 
from windmills will be increasingly competitive.  It will take time and 
money until the present technology is developed so that environmentally 
friendly energy will be available at competitive prizes.  The German gov-
ernment, especially the Ministry for the Protection of the Environment, be-
lieves that the objective is worth the effort.  Yet, European law becomes a 
factor by virtue of Article 87 of the EC Treaty which prohibits in principle 
“any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever. . .”142 
This is, of course, known to the German government and motivated 
the specific legislative design of the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (the law on 
feeding electricity from renewable energy sources into the public grid) of 
December 7, 1990,143 as amended in 1998.144  This law obliges regional 
public electricity suppliers to purchase all the electricity produced within 
their area of supply from renewable sources such as wind, water and sun 
and to pay a fixed minimum price for that electricity which is higher than 
that for other electricity.  Moreover, the law obliges upstream suppliers of 
electricity to pay partial compensation to those regional distribution under-
takings for the additional costs caused by that purchase obligation.145 
What is so clever about this legislative design?  The German Federal 
State and the state of Schleswig-Holstein are of course aware of European 
state aid law.  Article 87(1) EC Treaty prohibits in principle “any aid 
 
 142. Article 87(1) EU Treaty states that any aid granted by a Member State or through State re-
sources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, 
incompatible with the common market.  EC TREATY art. 87 (as amended), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art87_en.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 143. BGB. 1990 I, 2633. 
 144. BGB. 1998 I, 730. 
 145. For a very detailed account of the legislative history and the controversies surrounding it cf. 
the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, delivered on October 26, 2000 in Case C-379/98, paras. 5–62. 
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granted by a Member State or through State resources.” Article 87(2) and 
(3) lists two groups as exceptions to the rule.  One group enjoys per se le-
gality under Article 87(2).  Much more important and interesting is the sec-
ond group which subjects aid schemes to an evaluation by the Commission 
undertaken “in cooperation with the Member States” (Article 88).  Article 
88(3) obliges Member States to inform the Commission “of any plans to 
grant or alter aid” in a timely manner so that the Commission can evaluate 
such plans before they are put into effect. 
The German government had notified the Commission of its legisla-
tive intentions in 1990 and received a letter from the Commission authoriz-
ing the notified draft, explaining that it was in accordance with the energy 
policies of the EU and acceptable also because wind energy constituted 
only  a small segment of the market.146  In 1996, however, the Commission 
had informed the German Ministry for the Economy of its doubts as to 
whether in view of the increasing production of wind energy the Stromein-
speisungsgesetz was still compatible with the Treaty.147  The 1998 amend-
ment had not yet been notified.148 
The present conflict was, however, initiated by the private actors on 
which the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz imposes the duty to use and to pay 
wind energy. The plaintiff PreussenElektra AG complained about the com-
pensation of the extra costs the local energy distributor Schleswag AG in-
curred when purchasing from renewable sources.149  PreussenElektra ar-
gued that the 1994 amendment of the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, which had 
not been notified to the Commission, should not be applied and could 
hence not create an obligation to compensate Schleswag. As is apparent 
from the fact that Schleswag was held as to 65.3 percent by PreussenElek-
tra, the true addressee of the complaint was the German legislature whom 
the parties sought to correct with the help of European law.150 
Environmental protection is a mandatory Community objective [Arti-
cles 3 (1) (l) and 6)], just as it is a Staatsziel (objective of national interest) 
in Germany.  Thus, the conflict is not about the legitimacy of environ-
mental protection, but rather is about the competence to weigh the pros and 
cons of the Stromeinspeisung (i.e., the feeding of electricity from renew-
able energy sources into the public grid) policy.  If the scheme of the Ger-
man statute constituted a state aid in the sense of Article 87, it would, ac-
 
 146. Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswaf AG, 2001 E.C.R. I-02099, at para. 11. 
 147. Id. at para. 12. 
 148. Id. at para. 13. 
 149. Id. at paras. 20–21. 
 150. Id. 
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cording to Article 88, be up to the Commission to supervise the weighing 
between competitive and environmental rationality, and it could seek the 
confirmation of its assessment by the ECJ. 
Ever since 1993 and the Sloman Neptun cases151  the Court has chosen 
to read Article 87 literally: 
Only advantages granted directly or indirectly through state resources are 
to be considered aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1). The distinction 
made in that provision between ‘aid granted by a Member State’ and aid 
granted ‘through state resources’ does not signify that all advantages 
granted by a state, whether financed through state resources or not, con-
stitute aid, but is intended merely to bring within that definition both ad-
vantages which are granted directly by the state and those granted by a 
public or private body designated or established by the state.152 
This formalism, famously confirmed half a year later in Ferring,153 enabled 
the ECJ to keep itself at a distance from the quarreling between national 
and European governmental and nongovernmental actors, or so the ECJ 
may hope.  That hope is unfounded, the critics—most prominently by its 
own Advocate Generals154—argued that the ECJ’s formalism is an unsound 
judicial response to the governance arrangements modern state aid schemes 
use.155  In PreussenElektra the ECJ remained unimpressed: 
“[T]he case-law of the Court of Justice shows that only advantages 
granted directly or indirectly through State resources are to be considered 
aid within the meaning of Article 92(1). The distinction made in that 
provision between ‘aid granted by a Member State and aid granted 
‘through State resources does not signify that all advantages granted by a 
State, whether financed through State resources or not, constitute aid but 
 
 151. Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91, Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v. Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer, 
1993 E.C.R. I-887.  At issue was a measure enabling certain shipping undertakings flying the German 
flag to subject seafarers who were nationals of non-member countries to working conditions and rates 
of pay less favorable than those applicable to German nationals. 
 152. Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra, 2001 E.C.R. at para. 58. 
 153. Holding that a tax on direct sales imposed on pharmaceutical laboratories corresponds to the 
additional costs incurred by wholesale distributors in discharging their public service obligation, Case 
C-53/00, Ferring v. ACOSS, 2001 E.C.R. I-9067, at para. 27. 
 154. See Case C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v. WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., 2002 E.C.R. 
I4995, at paras. 73 (Léger, AG); Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Mag-
deburg v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, 2003 E.C.R. paras. 54 (Léger, AG).  See also Case 
C-126/01, Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie v. GEMO SA, 2003 E.C.R., paras. 87 
(Jacobs, AG) and joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01, Enirisorse SpA v. Ministero delle Finanze, 2003 
E.C.R. paras. 153 (Stix-Hackl, AG). 
 155. GERD SCHWENDINGER, DEUTSCHE RUNDFUNKGEBÜHREN—”STAATLICH ODER AUS 
STAATLICHEN MITTELN GEWÄHRT”?  ZUGLEICH EINE KRITISCHE BESTANDSAUFNAHME DER 
RECHTSPRECHUNG DES EUGH ZUR STAATLICHEN ZURECHENBARKEIT VON BEIHILFEN GEMÄß ART. 87 
ABS. 1 EGV (European University Institute Working Paper Law No. 2003/5), available at 
http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-5.pdf (last visited May 28, 2004).  Schwendinger comprehensively and 
thoughtfully addresses the PreussenElektra case.  Id. at 20. 
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is intended merely to bring within that definition both advantages which 
are granted directly by the State and those granted by a public or private 
body designated or established by the State. . . . 
In this case, the obligation imposed on private electricity supply under-
takings to purchase electricity produced from renewable energy sources 
at fixed minimum prices does not involve any direct or indirect transfer 
of State resources to undertakings which produce that type of electric-
ity.”156 
This is in no way convincing.  There are better ways available to balance 
the tensions between Community concerns and the political autonomy of 
Member States.  The ECJ demonstrated this in its recent Altmark Trans 
judgment.157 
2. Daseinsvorsorge in Sachsen-Anhalt (Services of General Interest 
in the Land of Sachsen-Anhalt).  This judgment was awaited with anticipa-
tion throughout Europe because it concerned the broader constitutional di-
mensions of European state aid control and privatization policies.  Altmark 
Trans is a conflict about the reorganization of public transport—just one 
example of the huge field of public interest services,158 organized differ-
ently throughout Europe in line with different national traditions and politi-
cal priorities as services publiques in France, and as Daseinsvorsorge159 in 
Germany.160  There is more at stake than a conflict over the competences at 
 
 156. Case C-379/98, paras. 58, 61.  Another difficult, but less troubling as aspect of the judgment is 
the Court’s handling of Article 28 in paras. 68–81.  The German scheme was not available to foreign 
suppliers. This seemed acceptable to the ECJ as it found, “the nature of electricity is such that, once it 
has been allowed into the transmission or distribution system, it is difficult to determine its origin and in 
particular the source of energy from which it was produced.”  Id. at para. 79. 
 157. Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans, 2003 E.C.R. 
 158. The debate has raged for nearly a decade.  See, e.g, Editorial: Public service obligations: A 
blessing or a liability?, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 395 (1996).  On the legal significance of the 
introduction of Aricle 16 by the Amsterdam Treaty see Ross, Article 16 and Services of General 
Interest: From Derogation to Obligation?, 25 EUR. L. REV. 22 (2000). 
 159. The history of that term deserves to be mentioned briefly.  The term was invented before 1933 
by a highly respected philosopher (Karl Jaspers), then introduced into administrative law by Ernst 
Forsthoff in 1938 in Daseinsvorsorge als Aufgabe der modernen Verwaltung, in ERNST FORSTHOFF, 
DIE VERWALTUNG ALS LEISTUNGSTRÄGER (1938), cited from the reprint in ERNST FORSTHOFF, 
RECHTSFRAGEN DER LEISTENDEN VERWALTUNG 23 (1959). 
 160. Public services can be defined as “services or activities, recognised as public in the sense that 
the State is seen as ultimately responsible for the provision of them, [but which] are nevertheless not 
provided by the State itself but by institutions which are intermediate between the market and the State. 
These institutions are, on the one hand, too independent of the State to be regarded as part of the State, 
but are, on the other hand, too closely and distinctly associated with the goals, activities, and responsi-
bilities of the State to be though of as simply part of the private sector of the political economy”; thus 
Mark Freedland, Law, Public Services, and Citizenship—New Domains, New Regimes, in PUBLIC 
SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW: PUBLIC AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES 3 (Mark 
Freedland & Silvana Sciarra eds., 1999).  This definition already presupposes that these services are no 
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different levels of government or the further development of environmental 
policies.  What makes the European involvement in this field so interesting 
and sensitive are notions of social justice. The northern European welfare 
states which have so far successfully reorganized and defended their social 
models, would have to surrender aspects of their welfare state models  if 
European law could insist on privatization policies which render their sup-
port of public services illegal.  The problems are of course complex. It is 
hardly disputed that so many public services deserve to be reorganized.  
That reorganization will have to ensure that non-local suppliers get access 
to publicly cofinanced service markets. There are many more reasons to 
welcome outside intervention and at might be that it is only thanks to the 
assignment of supervisory function to the European level of governance 
that the reform can be carried out successfully161—a long road to be sure, 
but Altmark Trans is a promising beginning. 
Altmark Trans GmbH and Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH 
both sought to organise public transport in the Landkreis of Stendal in 
Sachsen Anhalt, one of the new East German states (Länder).  Altmark 
Trans had been licensed, and procured renewal by the Regierung-
spräsidium (governmental authority of the Land), whereas the bid of Nah-
verkehrsgesellschaft was rejected.162  The ECJ was asked to delineate the 
scope of European secondary legislation and the competencies of the Ger-
man legislature.  The core issue, to which the ECJ responded, was the char-
acterization of the German support scheme.  The ECJ opinion builds from 
well-known definitions of state aid but then take two innovative steps.  
With the first, the ECJ reduces the supervisory powers of the European 
Commission by expressly accepting that it is up to the national authorities 
to define the public interest and to pay compensation for so-defined ser-
vices: 
Measures which, whatever their form, are likely directly or indirectly to 
favor certain undertakings or are to be regarded as an economic advan-
 
longer provided by administrative bodies but are privatized to a certain degree.  It is general enough to 
cover  various forms of “public-private partnerships” through which these services may be organized 
and, most importantly, it does not prescribe the public involvement in the provision of such services.  
This it cannot do because legal traditions, social expectations, political preferences, and administrative 
know-how all differ widely between Sicily and Mecklenburg, between Scotland and Greece, Estonia 
and Burgundy—and these differences have to be taken into account in the efforts which the Commis-
sion has initiated to reorganize them. 
 161. The most important recent official documents are: European Commission’s Communication: 
Communication on Services of General Interest of Sept. 11, 1996, COM(96)443 final; Report on Ser-
vices of General Interest of 17 October 2001, COM(01)598 final; Green Paper on Services of General 
Interest of 21 May 2003, COM(03)270 final. 
 162. See Case C-280/00, Altmark, 2003 E.C.R. at para. 21. 
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tage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under 
normal market conditions are regarded as aid.”163 
However, “where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for 
the services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge 
public service obligations, so that those undertakings do not enjoy a real 
financial advantage and the measure thus does not have the effect of put-
ting them in a more favorable competitive position than the undertakings 
competing with them, such a measure is not caught by Article 92(1) of the 
Treaty.”164 
The Court subjects the non-application of the state aids regime to four 
conditions: (1) the recipient must be required to discharge clearly defined 
public service obligations; (2) the parameters of the calculated compensa-
tion must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner; 
(3) the compensation must not exceed costs plus a reasonable profit; and 
(4) decisions are to be taken either after a public procurement procedure or 
the level of compensation is to be determined on the basis of an analysis of 
the costs of typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with 
adequate means of transport.165 
What is innovative about this holding is the redesign of the relations 
between the various levels of governance in the European Union.  The ECJ 
has opened the door for policy pluralism within the Union while at the 
same time relieving the Commission from a supervisory burden that it 
would hardly be able to cope with anyway.  To be sure, the new criteria the 
ECJ has spelled out must be refined further, but the prospects for produc-
tive contestation over the organization of public services have improved 
dramatically. 
III.  THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMIZATION IN THE 
EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS 
Section I of this essay concluded after mere theoretical deliberation 
that the Europeanization process will require the development of a new dis-
cipline which would conceptualize Europe as a multilevel system of gov-
ernance, overcoming the legacy of methodological nationalism in European 
law, comparative law and private international law.  The case studies in 
Section II can be read as confirming the utility of that analytical frame-
work.  Yet the practice of the ECJ has a utility of its own. This practice 
cannot be expected to fit neatly into the analytical and interpretative 
 
 163. Id. at para. 84 (citations omitted). 
 164. Id. at para. 87. 
 165. Id. at paras. 88-93. 
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schemes through which we have traditionally observed it.  The kind of con-
firmation we can expect is primarily negative in the sense that the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence is in fact often moving beyond the horizons of conventional 
legal doctrines.  The messages implicit in this jurisprudence do not, how-
ever, reveal a coherent set of responses to the problematic of multilevel 
governance.  How are we to interpret them? 
Three steps will be undertaken to answer this question.  The first two 
concern the theoretical framework of this essay.  The analytics of multi-
level governance will be presented in more detail.166  What then follows is 
a translation of the political science language into legal categories167 and a 
refinement of the normative perspectives sketched out at the end of the in-
troductory section.168 These perspectives will be concretized further in the 
concluding comments on the case studies. 
A. The European Polity as a “Multi-level System of Governance sui 
generis” 
“Less than a federation, more than a regime”—despite dating from 
1983, this characterization of the European polity by William Wallace 
dates is not outdated.169  Integration research continues to oscillate between 
federation and regime and the search for a positive definition of what the 
European Union is continues.  The notion en vogue today is a step forward.  
Students of the Integration Project have suggested, for some time now, that 
the EU is to be understood as a “multi-level system of governance”—akin 
to federations and other systems of governance.  What, then, is specific—
sui generis—about the European system?  This question is at the core of a 
very rich debate.170  The specification that I am relying on stresses the non-
hierarchical network character of the system—arguing that this perceived 
weakness is also a potential strength.  Because the powers and also, to 
some degree, the resources for political action, are located at various and 
relatively autonomous levels dispersed throughout the Union, the responses 
to functionally interwoven problems must be developed through communi-
 
 166. See discussion supra I.D. 
 167. For a more general and subtle discussion of such interdisciplinary borrowings see GUNTHER 
TEUBNER, NETZWERK ALS VERTRAGSVERBUND 17–22 (2004). 
 168. See discussion supra I.E. 
 169. William Wallace, Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a Political 
System, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 403–36 (Helen Wallace & William Wal-
lace eds., 1983). 
 170. For recent summaries, see Markus Jachtenfuchs, The Governance Approach to European In-
tegration, 39 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 245 (2001); Fritz W. Scharpf, Notes: Toward a Theory of Multi-
level Governing in Europe, 24 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 1 (2001); MARKUS JACHTENFUCHS & 
BEATE KOHLER-KOCH, EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION 11, 18 (2d ed. 2003). 
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cations between actors who are genuinely competent in their various do-
mains.  No longer does this lock us in what Fritz Scharpf has famously 
characterized as Europe’s “joint-decision trap” over two decades ago.171  
Institutional innovations and learning have instead lead to a much more fa-
vorable constellation.  Jürgen Neyer172 argues—and he is representative of 
this school of thought173—that, in the specific conditions of the European 
Union, successful solutions to problems can be expected from “delibera-
tive” modes of communication based on universal motivations tied to rules 
and principles.  What Neyer underlines in his analysis can be characterized 
as the “facticity”—the actual impact—of normativity.  The insight that the 
multilevel analysis portrays constellations that legal science confronts in a 
similar fashion, has gained ground over a number of years.174  The norma-
tive turn that Neyer gives to the multilevel approach, enhances its accessi-
bility and attractiveness for lawyers considerably.  It gives credit to the as-
sumption that European governance is not inconceivable by relying on 
deliberative interaction instead of the formation of hierarchies. 
B. Integration through Deliberation as an Alternative to Orthodox Supra-
nationalism 
It is a small step from such theorizing to an interpretation of legal pro-
visions as precepts for a communication-oriented, “deliberative” political 
style which can be easily explained in a broader context—in our “post-
 
 171. Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European 
Integration, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 239–78 (1988). 
 172. See J. Neyer, Discourse and Order in the EU: A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Gov-
ernance, 41 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. (2003).  Neyer elaborates further in J. NEYER, POSTNATIONALE 
POLITISCHE HERRSCHAFT: VERGESELLSCHAFTUNG UND VERRECHTLICHUNG JENSEITS DES STAATES 
(2004). 
 173. INTEGRATION THROUGH DELIBERATION? ON THE PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY 
(Erik O. Eriksen & John E. Fossum eds., 2000); DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE (Erik O. 
Eriksen et al. eds., 2004). 
 174. See, e.g., Ingolf Pernice, Multi-level Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: Euro-
pean Constitution-Making Revisited?, 36 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 703 (1999); FURRER, supra 
note 60, at 56, 155, and accompanying references.  Oddly and inexplicably, the comparative law tradi-
tion seems less impressed by all this than conflict of laws scholarship.  At the same time, there exists a 
conceptualization of the EU as a multi-level system demonstrates with particular emphasis on mutual 
influences between regulatory systems and the restructuring of international relations.  Of course, gen-
eralizing judgments in a discipline can always be falsified.  The law will respond in some way real 
problems and legal science in turn will reflect on them, explicitly or more implicitly.  Compare with 
further references by Watt, supra note 59); Ralf Michaels, Im Westen nichts neues? Zum Stand der 
Rechstvergleichung 100 Jahre nach dem Pariser Kongress—Gedanken anlässlich einer 
Jubiläumskonferenz in New Orleans [Nothing new in the West?  On the State of Comparative Law 100 
Years after the Paris Congress—Reflections on the Occasion of a Centennial Conference in New 
Orleans], 66 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 97 
(2002). 
FINAL JOERGES.DOC 3/8/2005  9:42 AM 
192 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:149 
national constellations,” typified by economic interpenetration and interde-
pendency, the extraterritorial effects of the decisions and omissions of de-
mocratic polities are simply unavoidable; yet the burdens imposed unilater-
ally on one’s neighbor cannot be sufficiently legitimated by “democratic” 
processes which are internal to the state.  It may seem like a paradox, but it 
has become an irrefutable insight—nation states cannot act democratically. 
“No taxation without representation”—this is a principle that imposes on 
the Member States of the EU the obligation to take account of the interests 
and concerns of non-nationals even within the national polity.175  “Delib-
erative” supranationalism is an alternative to orthodox notions of suprana-
tionalism which have underlined the autonomy of European law and its su-
premacy over national law.  It also deviates from the “integration-through-
law” tradition, in that it seeks to overcome the law-politics dichotomy in-
herent in J. H. H. Weiler’s famous distinction between legal supranational-
ism and political intergovernmentalism.176 
The normative core message of Deliberative Supranationalism is that 
Europe, through its supranational rules and principles, should give voice to 
“foreign” concerns and insist that Member States mutually “recognize” 
their laws (essentially that they “apply” foreign law) and refrain from in-
sisting on their lex fori and domestic interests.  The discipline this principle 
seeks to impose on a Member State’s political autonomy is limited.177  The 
 
 175. See Joerges, The Impact of European Integration, supra note 60, at 390. 
 176. J.H.H. Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, in 1 Y.B. 
EUR. L. 257–306 (1981). 
 177. See the analyses by FURRER, supra note 60, at 171; JOHANNES FETSCH, EINGRIFFSNORMEN 
UND EG-VERTRAG 126, 139 (2002).  For a discussion of the conflict of laws principles, see id. at 21, 
71.  See SCHMID, supra note 1, at 167.  For a heuristic using American conflict of law methodologies 
for the structuring of European Kollisionsrecht see Christian Joerges, “Deliberative Supranational-
ism”—Two Defences, 8 EUR. L.J. 133, 135 (2002), with references especially to Brainerd Currie, Notes 
on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Law, in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 177 (1963); Brainerd Currie, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 
1233, 1242 (1963).  I have no difficulty with characterizing the mediation between differences in regu-
latory policies and the diverse interests of the concerned jurisdictions that ECJ’s jurisprudence has so 
often achieved as a truly European law of conflict of laws.  The decisive difference with Currie’s think-
ing is the turn to deliberation as a mode of legitimizing the resolution of conflicts.  Currie insisted that 
“[the C]hoice between the competing interests of co-ordinated states is a political function of a high 
order, which ought not, in a democracy, to be committed to the judiciary: . . . the court is not equipped 
to perform such a function; and the Constitution specifically confers that function upon Congress.”  
Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial 
Function, in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 272 (1963).  De-
liberative Supranationalism advocates exactly that—It is “deliberative” in that it does not content itself 
with appealing to the supremacy of European law; it is European because it seeks to identify principles 
and rules which make differing laws in the EU compatible; with this ambition it stands “above” national 
law, because it indicates and declares binding a metanorm under which intra-European conflicts can be 
resolved.  For a more detailed elaboration see Joerges, Deliberative Supranationalism—Two Defences, 
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principle and its limitations can be discovered and studied best in the juris-
prudence on Article 30 (now 28).  The ECJ has so often convincingly dem-
onstrated178 how the idiosyncrasies of individual states can be identified as 
such and reduced to a civilized level—autonomieschonend und gemein-
schaftsverträglich (protective of autonomy and compatible with the Com-
munity).179 
What can be achieved through an enlightened interpretation of Article 
28 of the EC Treaty is a resolution of frictions among national jurisdictions.  
But this is a very incomplete characterization of the challenges European 
law faces.  Three interdependent complications need to be outlined. 
There is a need to find a mechanism for the reconciliation of a broader 
variety of conflicting policies and legal traditions.  The “orthodox” answer 
to such constellations has been “harmonization”—a search for uniformity 
which would rule out future conflicts.  This was the strategy of the ECJ in 
the product liability cases discussed above.180 Its answer was neither 
workable nor normatively attractive.  Legislative acts like the Product Li-
ability Directive are selective interventions into complex legal fields.  Such 
acts may at best cause some irritation;181 where rules are so specific as 
those of the product liability directive to which the ECJ ascribed pre-
emptive effects, the intervention will have disintegrative consequences 
which damage the normative coherence of an entire field of law. 
Is ever more comprehensive harmonization—in the case of private 
law, a European code—a promising alternative, as so many observers be-
lieve?182  If so, how comprehensive should such a code be?  The propo-
 
supra, at 135 and Christian Joerges, Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance: Exploring a 
Magic Triangle, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM § 1.3.2 (Christian Jo-
erges et al. eds., 2004). 
 178. See, e.g., M. MADURO POIARES, WE THE COURT 150 (1998); J.H.H. WEILER, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 221 (1999). 
 179. Fritz W. Scharpf, Autonomieschonend und gemeinschaftsverträglich. Zur Logik der 
europäischen Mehrebenenpolitik, in FRITZ W. SCHARPF, OPTIONEN DES FÖDERALISMUS IN 
DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA (1994), 131.  As a follow-up to introductory note **, I may point to 
analogies and contrasts in Brainerd Currie’s conflict-of-laws theories even though the comparison may 
seem at first glance far-fetched.  Currie was a “methodological nationalist” in his insistence on the im-
portance of the lex fori and his plea for the defense of “governmental interests” by courts.  But in his 
later writings, he has allowed for a “moderate and restrained interpretation” of state interests so as to 
“avoid” conflicts.  See Currie, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 177, at 1242; Brainerd Cur-
rie, The Disinterested Third State, 28  L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 763 (1963).  On the related term 
“avoidable conflicts” see DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 73 (1965). 
 180. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 181. As in the case of the good faith principle of the unfair contract terms directive, analyzed by 
Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law Or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Di-
vergences, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 182. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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nents of a European code pay little attention to the “regulatory embedded-
ness” of private law.  The present state of that relation mirrors Europe’s 
multilevel governance.  Whereas the traditional core areas of private law 
have retained much of their familiar grammar, the institutional frameworks 
of the private economy and the concomitant regulatory activities have been 
“Europeanized.”  Thus, Europeanization has radically altered the overall 
legal (and normative) environment in which private law operates.  This dis-
crepancy between the apparent survival of private law institutions has led 
to an erosion of their social function which is often neglected.183  If this ob-
servation is valid, does it not become ever more plausible to opt for a Euro-
pean code?  I have characterized the discrepancies between (European) 
regulatory provisions and national private law as “diagonal” conflicts.184  It 
has become apparent, albeit only in the specific fields under scrutiny here, 
that there are alternatives available to uniformity.  It is possible, so we have 
argued, to retain diversity and to nevertheless ensure the workability of the 
internal market.185 This alternative is normatively attractive because it re-
spects the political autonomy of lower levels of governance. 
Yet it is not merely a normative preference for diversity and for a de-
centralized Europe which motivate this plea for caution.  A further objec-
tion against codification stems from the logic of justification institutional-
ized in our systems of private law and adjudication on the one hand and in 
the fields of regulatory policies on the other.  Regarding the latter,186 the 
prerogatives of the European in all fields of economic and social regulation 
level have led to the establishment of complex transnational governance ar-
rangements involving European and national, governmental and non-
governmental actors. These governance arrangements accomplish a con-
tinuous supervision of the regulated fields, flexible responses to changes, 
and the revision of agreed upon standards.  The nature and legitimacy of 
regulatory policies is distinct and each field follows a dynamics of its own.  
The links and potential tensions within private law vary broadly.  One par-
ticularly interesting example is the present “modernization” of European 
competition policy,187 which will affect its impact on private law—
 
 183. See Joerges, The Impact of European Integration, supra note 60; Christian Joerges, European 
Challenges to Private Law: On False Dichotomies, True Conflicts and the Need for a Constitutional 
Perspective, 18 LEGAL STUD. 146–66 (1998). 
 184. See  II.C supra. 
 185. Supra II.C and II.B. 
 186. On the follwing in more detail Christian Joerges & Michelle Everson, Law, Economics and 
Politics in the Constitutionalization of Europe, in ERIK O. ERIKSEN ET AL., DEVELOPING A 
CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, 162–79. 
 187. See Council Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition, 2003 O.J. 
(L 1) and the officious explanations by Emil Paulis, Latest Commission Thinking Progress on the Mod-
FINAL JOERGES.DOC 3/8/2005  9:42 AM 
2004] THE CHALLENGES OF EUROPEANIZATION IN THE REALM OF PRIVATE LAW 195 
especially on contract law—considerably.  The regulation of product risks 
and standardization are fields which underwent dramatic changes during 
the last decade and are unlikely to come to rest in the foreseeable future.  In 
all fields of regulatory policy, Europe must balance centralization, coordi-
nation, and decentralization.  It has relegated the adaptation of private law 
to the European regulatory environment, to national legal systems, and es-
pecially to national courts.  If flexibility is both a necessity and a goal of 
regulatory policy, more legislative uniformity in private law or its codifica-
tion hardly seems desirable. 
Private law systems are different in many ways, but not in their need 
for flexibility and their need to seek legitimacy in the processes of law pro-
duction.  That production is not confined to the application of previously 
given rules; nor does it operate in full autonomy.  It is exposed to a con-
tinuing discourse with interested parties, experts and academics—and to 
the threat of legislative interventions.  The legitimacy and rationality of the 
interplay of legislation, case law, scholarship and political discourse is the 
resource which generates its legitimacy.188  This resource is not available in 
the European polity because that polity remains heterarchical. European 
law is legitimated to instigate innovation and change, to organize diversity, 
and to ensure the compatibility of diversity with Community concerns—its 
vocation is not to produce uniformity.189 
C. Europeanization as Process 
To summarize this lengthy argument: The complexity of the Europe-
anization process is nobody’s “mistake.”  It is not by chance that we wit-
ness such a multifaceted mixture of “primary law” which grants basic free-
doms and rights; transnational governance arrangements which organize 
regulatory activities; and legislative and judicial interventions which irri-
tate. This mixture is the State of the (European) Union.  It is by no means a 
comfortable situation, yet it has great potential—at least in theory.  Its per-
formance to date has not been so bad—at least in the examples we have ex-
amined here. 
 
ernization of Antitrust, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: A NEW ROLE FOR THE MEMBER STATES 15–
31 (2001). 
 188. See Rudolf Wiethölter, Zum Fortbildungsrecht der (richterlichen) Rechtsfortbildung: Fragen 
eines lesenden Recht-Fertigungslehrers, 3 KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG 
UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 1 (1988).  For American law see PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL 
COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 450 (1992). 
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The ECJ’s recent product liability cases can be interpreted as a move 
back into orthodox supranationalism.  But this is a worst case scenario.  
The Court will realize that the European product liability law directive is a 
relatively insignificant element in a complex web of product safety law and 
regulation which, in Europe, is intimately related to semi-private European-
ized standardization activities.  It is of course a highly contested sphere, but 
none of the stakeholders are likely to encourage the ECJ to take the 1985 
directive as a basis from which European level of governance would seize 
control of legal developments. 
The Centros jurisprudence, however, is of another caliber.  Here, the 
ECJ has transformed the freedoms ensured by the EC Treaty into a true 
European citizenship by empowering the Untertan (subject) of a Member 
State to bring his or her own sovereign to court and force national govern-
ments to provide justification for their regulatory practices.  The Court also 
has managed to create a legal framework linking the various levels of 
European governance without assigning comprehensive Kompetenz-
Kompetenz—the power to determine one’s range of competencies—to any 
of them. 
The ECJ has performed less well in its reaction to the tensions be-
tween European state aid policies on the one hand, and national environ-
mental concerns and industrial policy objectives on the other in the 
PreussenElektra case.190 Its restrictive definition of state aid allows flexi-
bility for legislative strategies by national policy makers which avoid any 
contestation.191 This type of judicial self-restraint has been followed and 
corrected by a much more promising strategy in the Altmark Trans judg-
ment. The reform of public services (services publiques, Daseinsvorsorge) 
need not have uniform results.  Legal traditions, social expectations, politi-
cal preferences, and administrative know-how differ widely between Sicily 
and Estonia, between Scotland and Greece.  Europe can continue to initiate 
further changes and foster social learning at the same time.  This is its 
mandate—the imposition of uniform regimes would be a nightmare.192 
Europeanization is about social learning through conflict management 
and contestation.  The role of law in such a law in that process is essential. 
But the law itself must learn how to find principles and provide procedures 
which organize the interactions between political actors and courts at vary-
ing levels of governance, and must function to both accompany and legiti-
mate social change.  This is both a challenge and an opportunity. 
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